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DID FALWELL HUSTLE HUSTLER?
ALLOWING PUBLIC FIGURES TO RECOVER
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES FOR NONLIBELOUS
SATIRE
Traditionally, authors of critical commentary have utilized satire' as an
influential technique by which to express opinions on political issues and
societal standards. 2 By making humorous yet often stinging attacks against
government, private organizations, and even well-respected individuals, sat-
irists noticeably have influenced many political and societal trends. 3 Courts,
1. See Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trademark, and Copyright:
Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U.L. REv. 923, 923-24 & nn.1 & 3 (1985)(defining "satire");
WEsisr's Tanu, NEw INThEuATIoNA. DICTIONARY 2017 (1981) (same). By publicly scoffing at
cherished virtues and values, satirists attempt to cause readers to reevaluate accepted customs.
Dorsen, supra, at 923 nn.l & 3. Generally, satire embodies three characteristic features. Id. at
924. First. satire usually vividly describes either a painful or absurd situation or a foolish or evil
person. Id.; G. HIGHr, Tin ANATOMY OF SAxrmE 18 (1962). Second, satire uses sharply critical
and often crude language to disturb the reader. Dorsen, supra, at 924. Finally, most satire
attempts to evoke both laughter and contempt from the reader. Id.; G. Hsoinr, supra, at 18-
21. In attempting to affect societal attitudes, satire often creates embarrassment and hurt feelings.
Dorsen, supra, at 925.
2. See Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484, 487 (4th Cir. 1986) (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting)
(describing historical tradition of political satire), cert. granted sub nom. Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell, 107 S. Ct. 1601 (1987); Dorsen, supra note 1, at 923-25 (discussing importance
of satirical commentary); see also Rich & Brilliant, Defamation-in-Fiction: The Limited Viability
of Alternative Causes of Action, 52 BROOKLYN L. Rzv. 1, 3-5 (1986) (discussing importance
of free expression in fiction). Satire began as a distinct form of literature as early as the
second century B.C. in Rome. See G. Hioanr, supra note 1, at 24-44 (discussing satire in
early Rome and Greece). Satirists, attempting to cause readers to reevaluate habits and customs,
often try to make readers uncomfortable by publicly ridiculing accepted values and institutions.
Dorsen, supra note 1, at 923 n. 1; see supra note 1 (defining "satire"). Often, the failure of
a satire to cause readers to experience distress signifies the failure of a satirist to achieve his
purported goal. Falwell, 805 F.2d at 487. Satirists use satire to destroy facades and unmask
hypocrisy. Id. Often, satires have had a more significant effect on societal attitudes than
factual reports. See Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 868, 603 P.2d 454,
459, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 357 (1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring) (Dickens and Dostoevski may
have had more impact on societal attitudes than factual recitations); Dorsen, supra note I, at
923 n. 4 (satire often has more bite than factual recitations). See generally M. HODOART,
SATmE 10-32 (1969) (discussing origins and principles that underlie satire).
3. See S. TOWER, CARTOONS AND LAMPOONS: Tan ART OF Pomc A SATna 13-14 (1982)
(describing influence of political satire). Famous satirists such as Horace, Voltaire, Shakespeare,
Woody Allen, and Garry Trudeau have influenced societal attitudes by humorously attacking
accepted ideas and notable leaders, often in unflattering ways. See Dorsen, supra note 1, at
923 (listing famous satirists). An example of an attack on a well-respected leader involves a
famous colonial cartoon about George Washington. See W. MURREL, A HIsToRY OF AMERicAN
GRA'mc HUMOR 34 (1933) (describing cartoon satire about Washington). In the cartoon, as
Washington's aide David Humphreys guides the donkey on which Washington sits, the caption
reads, "The glorious time has come to pass/When David shall conduct an ass." See id. Other
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attempting to encourage the press to publicize new ideas and opinions,
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leaders often have been the focus of biting satirical attacks. See, e.g., S. HEss & M. KAPLAN,
THE UNGENTLEMANLY ART: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLrrICAL CARTOONS 106 & 108 (1968)
(describing satires about James A. Garfield as unwed mother and Grover Cleveland as father
of illegitimate children); W. MURRELL, supra, at 49 (describing satirical attack against Thomas
Jefferson); S. TOWER, supra, at 99-115 (describing satirical attacks against Lincoln). See
generally E. JOHNSON, A TREASURY OF SATIRE (1945) (providing examples of satires from
ancient Greek period to twentieth century).
4. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268-70 (1964) (recognizing that
free exchange of ideas promotes beneficial social change). Commentators have suggested
numerous theories in analyzing the reasons for and bases of the first amendment freedom of
the press. See M. FRANKiIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA LAw 11-52 (3d ed. 1987)
(describing various theories that commentators have advanced about first amendment protec-
tion). The United States Supreme Court generally has defined three basic functions of the first
amendment. First, the first amendment, by fostering individual self-expression, allows individ-
uals the freedom to seek self-fulfillment. See City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96
(1972) (first amendment functions to foster individual self-expression and self-fulfillment).
Second, the first amendment, by allowing individuals to discuss openly thoughts and grievances,
serves as a "safety valve" that stabilizes government by creating an open, nonrepressive society.
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 354, 375 (1927) (first amendment functions as "safety
valve"). The third and most widely accepted view is that the first amendment serves an
enlightenment function, allowing the discovery of truth through the free dissemination of
information. See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1969) (first
amendment functions to allow press to enlighten public by disseminating information); Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 354, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (first amendment allows
press to enlighten public); M. NuAMFR, NimmmR ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1.02[A], at 1-7
(1984) (enlightenment function is foundation of first amendment). The enlightenment function
embodies the "marketplace of ideas" theory, which suggests that when a government allows
individuals to express freely both true and false ideas, the competition of those ideas in the
"marketplace of ideas" will allow true ideas to triumph over false ideas' See Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (advancing idea that compe-
tition among ideas provides best test of truth); see also M. NIMaR, supra, § 1.02[A], at 1-9
(discussing marketplace of ideas theory). But see Baker, Scope of the First Amendment
Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 964, 967-81 (1978) (rejecting classic marketplace of
ideas theory). In recognizing the beneficial value of free exchanges of ideas, the United States
Supreme Court has determined that the United States Constitution protects an individual's
freedom to express his views on public issues. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1956);
see U.S. CONST. amend. I (granting freedoms of speech and press). The Court has determined
that the first amendment requires that individuals have opportunities to discuss political matters
and policies. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); see U.S. CONsT. amend. I
(granting freedom of speech). The Court recognized that when the opportunity for free political
discussion exists, individuals legally may effect political changes by verbally influencing others
as to the correctness of new ideas. Id. Although not all individuals will use this privilege of
free expression to speak on matters of good taste, the first amendment does not differentiate
between offensive and inoffensive expression, but unilaterally guarantees the right to express
new ideas. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941); see U.S. CONST. amend. I (granting
freedoms of speech and press).
Although the first amendment guarantees the right to express new ideas, this right is not
absolute. See infra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing nonabsolute interpretation of
first amendment freedoms). In determining whether the first amendment allows a court to
punish an individual for expressing a particular idea or opinion, the Court most often has
adopted a balancing approach that weighs the government's need to protect a particular interest
against an individual's right to express an idea. See M. FRANKLIN, supra, at 45 (describing
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generally have afforded satirists substantial legal protection from the victims
of satirical comment by recognizing that the freedom of the press clause
enumerated in the first amendment of the United States Constitutions
Supreme Court's use of balancing approach). In balancing first amendment freedoms against
governmental concerns, the Court has not distinguished formally between the protections
granted by the freedom of speech and by the freedom of the press. See, e.g., Houchins v.
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1978) (denying press access to prison to which ordinary individual
does not have access); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 563-67 (1978) (denying press
exemption from police search); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976)
(applying freedom of speech language to action against press); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (interchangeably using terms "freedom of speech" and
"freedom of press"); Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 455,
456 (1983) (describing Supreme Court's failure to distinguish between freedoms of speech and
press). One commentator has suggested that, although Supreme Court decisions have not
afforded the press any substantial protections under the first amendment "press" clause that
individuals do not receive under the first amendment "speech" clause, the Court has not
rejected the possibility that the press clause could grant the press greater rights than the speech
clause grants nonmedia individuals. See Anderson, supra, at 459 (Supreme Court has not
rejected idea that press clause could have independent significance). Commentators disagree
on whether the freedom of the press should receive additional protection independently from
the freedom of speech. Compare Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press a Redun-
dancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 658 (1975) (first
amendment press and speech clauses should receive separate consideration) and Stewart, "Or
Of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975) (press clause confers special status that other
private business does not receive) with Lange, The Speech & Press Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L.
Rav. 77, 107-18 (1975) (describing possible dangers in separating freedom of press from
freedom of speech) and Van Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press of Claiming a "Preferred
Position," 28 HASTINGS L.J.761, 768-80 (1977) (press clause should receive no more weight than
speech clause).
5. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. The first amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of sppech, or of the press
.." Id. Although the first amendment creates these freedoms, the Bill of Rights fails to define
adequately the term "freedom." Brown & Chamberlain, Introduction to THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RiisTm: NEw PEPPCTs'cvEs ON THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS at 1 (1982).
Because congressional records that pertain to Congress' passage of the Bill of Rights are virtually
nonexistent, Congress' intent in enacting the first amendment provides no basis by which to
define the term "freedom." Blanchard, Filling in the Void: Speech and Press in State Courts
Prior to Giflow, in TE FsIt AMENDMENT RaLus : Naw PERSPEcT1vEsoN TIM MEANING OF
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS 14, 45 n.14 (1982); see Anderson, supra note 4, at 485
(describing difficulties in determining reasons of Congress and various state legislatures for
adopting first amendment). Commentators disagree over Congress' reasons for including the
freedom of the press in the Bill of Rights. See N. DoEsEN, P. BENDER & B. NEUBoRNE, I
EMERSON, HABER & DoRsEN's POLInCAL AND Crv. RIGTrrs IN THE UNITED STATES 20-24 (4th
ed. 1976) (contrasting different views of first amendment framers' intentions). Compare Z.
CHAFE, FREE SPEECH IN Tim UNIrn STATES 20 (1941) (first amendment drafters wanted
liberty of press to provide right of unrestricted discussion of public affairs) with L. LEvY,
LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRISS IN EARLY AMRICAN HISTORY vii-viii
(1960) (first amendment drafters did not believe in broad scope for freedom of press in
political discussion).
Although doubt continues to exist over the framers' intended interpretation of the freedom
of the press, twentieth-century court decisions have attempted to answer many questions
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protects the press' publication of satirical and fictional works.6 The use of
satirical comment, however, does not constitute an unrestricted privilege.
7
regarding modern interpretations of the freedom of the press. See, e.g., New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (first amendment protects press from liability for
false statements made without knowing disregard of truth); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
713 (1931) (first amendment protects press from prior restraints on publication); Oilman v.
Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975-76 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (first amendment protects expression
of opinion), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985). The meaning of the first amendment freedom
of the press, however, has not remained constant. Brown & Chamberlin, supra, at 1. For
example, although in the early nineteenth century Congress enacted a law that imposed criminal
liability for publishing or writing seditious libel, a false, malicious, and scandalous statement
against the government, the United States Supreme Court in the twentieth century has
recognized that punishing individuals who publish seditious libel violates the first amendment.
See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 276 (attacking constitutional validity of early sedition laws);
see also Anderson, supra note 4, at 515-23 (discussing inconsistency of 1798 Sedition Act with
first amendment freedom of press clause).
In addition to recognizing that punishing sedition is inconsistent with the first amendment
freedom of the press, the Supreme Court generally has interpreted the first amendment as
affording the press substantial first amendment protection in numerous areas. See, e.g., New
York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (first amendment prohibits holding press liable for publishing
false statements when press published false statements without knowingly disregarding truth);
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1938) (first amendment protects freedom to distribute
political pamphlets, leaflets, newspapers, and books); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233, 244-45, 250 (1936) (first amendment prohibits states from imposing taxes to punish
press for publishing information); Near, 283 U.S. at 713 (first amendment prohibits prior
restraints on publication); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (first amendment
freedom of press applies to state action through fourteenth amendment). The Supreme Court,
however, has not provided the press with an absolute privilege to publish without accountability
any material that the press chooses. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982)
(first amendment does not prohibit state from restricting publication of child pornography
that visually depicts sexual conduct by children); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) (first amendment does not prohibit entertainer from recovering
damages for violation of right of publicity when press broadcasts entertainer's act without
permission); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (first amendment does not protect
press' publication of obscene material); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (first amendment
does not protect false material published with knowing or reckless disregard of truth); see also
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) (publication of obscene material receives
no constitutional protection under freedoms of speech or press); Near, 283 U.S. at 716
(recognizing that first amendment may allow prior restraint in exceptional circumstances).
6. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-11 (1974) (applying first amend-
ment protection to political symbolism); Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670-71
(1973) (per curiam) (applying first amendment protection to offensive cartoon depicting
policeman raping Statue of Liberty); Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 695 F.2d 438, 440, 442 (10th
Cir. 1982) (applying first amendment protection to fiction), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983);
Loeb v. Globe Newspaper Co., 489 F. Supp. 481, 486 (D. Mass. 1980) (applying first
amendment protection to political cartoon); United States ex rel. Radich v. Criminal Court of
New York, 385 F. Supp. 165, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (applying first amendment protection to
political satire involving flag desecration); Yorty v. Chandler, 13 Cal. App. 3d 467, 476-77,
91 Cal. Rptr. 709, 715 (1970) (applying first amendment protection to satirical cartoon); Myers
v. Boston Magazine Co., 380 Mass 336, -, 403 N.E.2d 376, 377-80 (1980) (applying first
amendment protection to satirical statement).
7. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1974) (first amendment
freedoms are not absolute); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971) (same); Konisberg v.
[Vol. 44:1381
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Courts increasingly have recognized that, although the first amendment
protects satirical commentary, a person who is the subject of a satirical
work can recover damages from satirists in some situations. s For example,
courts have determined that, under the first amendment, a plaintiff can
recover damages for defamation 9 if the believability of false facts underlying
California, 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1961) (same); Dorsen, supra note 1, at 926 (court analysis of
cases involving satirical comment should employ same first amendment balancing test that
courts use in other cases). Several commentators and judges have suggested that protection of
first amendment freedoms should be absolute. See, e.g., Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.
L. Ray. 865, 874 (1960) (first amendment provides absolute protection for freedoms of speech
and press); Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes:" A Public Interview, 37
N.Y.U. L. Rav. 549, 552-54 (1962) (discussing Justice Black's absolutist interpretation of first
amendment); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. Rav. 245, 262-
63 (first amendment freedoms should receive absolute protection); see also Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (supporting absolutist interpretation
of first amendment); M. NIMAER, supra note 4, § 2.01, at 2-3 n.5 (explaining differing views
held by Supreme Court justices on absolutist interpretation of first amendment). Supporters
of the absolutist interpretation argue that the terms of the first amendment are literal and
absolute. See M. NrM&ER, supra note 4, § 2.01, at 2-2 (describing absolutist argument). The
Supreme Court, however, never has accepted an absolutist interpretation of the first amend-
ment. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stewart, 427 U.S. 539, 704 (1976) (rejecting absolutist
interpretation of first amendment); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (same); Saia
v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (same); supra note 5 (discussing absolutist approach).
In freedom of speech cases, the Supreme Court most often balances first amendment freedoms
against other governmental and individual concerns. See supra note 4 (discussing balancing
approach that Court uses in first amendment cases).
8. See Dorsen, supra note 1, at 928-63 (discussing judicial remedies for harm resulting
from satire). In attempting to recover damages from satirists for the harm resulting from a
satire's publication, plaintiffs have claimed that a particular satire has defamed a plaintiff,
that a satire has infringed a plaintiff's ownership of a trademark, and that a satire has
infringed a plaintiff's ownership of a copyright. Id. at 925. Courts have allowed plaintiffs to
recover for trademark infringement when a business' satirical appropriation of a plaintiff's
trademark tends to cause consumers to confuse the products produced by the plaintiff with
those produced by the business that satirically appropriated the plaintiff's trademark. See
Playboy Enters. v. Chuckleberry Publishing Co., 687 F.2d 563, 569 (2d Cir. 1982) (defendant
infringed "Playboy" trademark by using name "Playmen" on sexually explicit magazine);
Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838, 839-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(infringement of "Gucci" trademark found when defendant sold diaper bags called "Gucchi
Goo"). Additionally, many courts have allowed plaintiffs to recover for copyright infringement
when a satiist has "borrowed" a copyrighted work to publish a satirized version of that
copyrighted work. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1980) (defendant's
parody of plaintiff's copyrighted song infringed copyright); Walt Disney Publications, Inc. v.
Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding copyright infringement when
defendant published drawings of Disney characters in sexual situations), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1132 (1979). One commentator has argued that courts often misapply the trademark and
copyright laws in satirical comment cases. See Dorsen, supra note 1, at 939-63 (discussing
courts' misapplication of trademark and copyright law in satire cases).
9. See RESTATEM:ENT (SEcozD) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (defining "defamation"); W.
KEETON, PROSSER AND KETON ON TORTS § 111, at 773-78 (5th ed. 1984) (same); R. SACK,
LIBEL, SLADER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 45-48 (1980) (same); BLACK'S LAW DIcnONARY 375-
76 (5th ed. 1979) (same). Defamation involves an expression, verbal or nonverbal, that tends
to injure an individual's reputation by exciting derogatory or contemptuous feelings against
1987]
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a satire injures the plaintiff's reputation.' 0 Courts, however, generally rec-
ognize that, under first amendment defamation standards," satires that
that individual. R. SACK, supra, at 45; BLACK'S LAW DIcTONARY 375 (5th ed. 1979).
Defamation includes both libel, a written or visual defamation, and slander, a spoken or aural
defamation. R. SACK, supra, at 43.
10. See Martin v. Municipal Publications, 510 F. Supp. 255, 258 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (comical
statement is defamatory if reasonable person would believe that comical statement expresses
true facts); Buller v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 684 S.W.2d 473, 478-79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding satirist liable for believable false statement of fact in satirical cartoon); see also
Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 76-78, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 38-39 (fictionalized novel
defamed plaintiff by including false statements of fact), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979);
Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 127-29, 233 N.E.2d 840, 843, 286 N.Y.S.2d
832, 834-36 (1967) (defendant defamed plaintiff in biography by attributing fictionalized
statements to plaintiff), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969); U.S. CONsT. amend. I (estab-
lishing freedom of press). By allowing a subject of a satirical work to recover defamation
damages, courts have recognized that believable, false statements of fact in a satire can damage
a person's reputation. See Martin, 510 F. Supp. at 258 (plaintiff may recover defamation
damages for false statements of fact that defendant stated in comical context); Embrey v.
Holly, 48 Md. App. 571, 581-82, 429 A.2d 251, 259 (1981) (humorous statement can damage
person's reputation if readers believe statement expresses true facts), rev'd in part, 293 Md.
App. 128, 442 A.2d 966 (1982); Silsdorf v. Levine, 59 N.Y.2d 8, 15-16, 449 N.E.2d 716, 720
(plaintiffs can recover damages for humorous false statement if plaintiffs demonstrate that
falsities would affect conclusions of average reader), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983);
Salomone v. MacMillan Publishing Co., 97 Misc. 2d 346, 350-51, 411 N.Y.S.2d 105, 109
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 77 A.D.2d 501, 429 N.Y.S.2d 441
(1980). Although a satirist may not have intended for readers to believe literally the statements
asserted in a satire, a subject of a satirical work may be able to recover damages from a
satirist who fails clearly to assert to the reader that the statement is satirical and not serious.
See Embrey, 48 Md. App. at 581-82, 429 A.2d at 259 (jury question exists when reader could
interpret humorous statement as stating either true fact or opinion); Salomone, 97 Misc. 2d
at 351, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 109 (same). The subject of a satirical work cannot recover defamation
damages, however, solely because a satirist's false assertions about a person are believable and
injure that person's reputation. See LaRocca v. New York News, Inc., 156 N.J. Super. 59,
62, 383 A.2d 451, 453 (1978) (court must find defendant's fault before allowing plaintiff to
recover damages for harm to reputation resulting from satirical cartoon's publication); Mis-
kovsky v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 654 P.2d 587, 595 (Okla.) (denying recovery for
defamation when defendant did not exhibit malicious intent), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 923 (1982);
infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (discussing reputational injury and falsity requirements
in defamation cases). The United States Supreme Court has determined that, for a plaintiff
to recover for defamation, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with some measure
of fault. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1565 (plaintiff in
defamation action must prove that media defendant acted with fault), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1784 (1986); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (public officials
must prove defendant published statement with knowing disregard of truth); infra notes 11 &
39 (discussing fault requirements in defamation cases).
11. See I A. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS 141 (Supp. III 1976) (discussing
proof requirements that Supreme Court has developed for defamation actions); see also B.
DILL, TBE JOURNALIST'S HANDBOOK ON LIBEL AND PRIVACY 10-32 (1986) (discussing development
of constitutional proof standards in defamation law); C. MORRIS, MODERN DEFAMAToN LAW
6-28 (ALI 1978) (same); Note, Private Lives and Public Concerns: The Decade Since Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 51 BROOKLYN L. R-v. 425, 429-30 (1985) (summarizing development of
constitutional first amendment defamation standards); Comment, Defamation in Fiction: The
Case for Absolute First Amendment Protection, 29 AM. U.L. REv. 571, 576-77 (1980) (same).
[Vol. 44:13811386
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convey unbelievable assertions should not constitute defamatory statements.
2
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, first imposed
constitutional limitations on state defamation laws. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (recognizing that first amendment limits public official plaintiff's
ability to recover against press for defamation). The Supreme Court in New York Times
determined that, under the first amendment, a public official cannot compel the press to pay
damages for publishing a defamatory falsehood relating to the public official's official conduct
unless the public official proves with convincing clarity that the press acted with "actual
malice." Id. at 279-80; see infra note 13 (defining "public official"). The Supreme Court in
New York Times defined "actual malice" as the publication of a statement "with knowledge
that [the statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether [the statement] was false
or not." Id. at 280; see St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (defining "reckless"
conduct as publishing defamatory falsehood with "serious doubt" as to statement's truth). In
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the Supreme Court extended the "actual malice" fault standard
to public figures' actions against the press. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164-
65 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring); see infra note 13 (defining "public figure").
Although the actual malice fault standard applies in defamation actions brought by public
officials and public figures, the Supreme Court has not extended the actual malice requirement
to defamation actions brought by private figures. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 347 (1974) (allowing private figures to recover defamation damages after proving press'
negligence); infra note 14 (defining "private figure"). Although the Supreme Court, in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., found that all plaintiffs, both public and private, must
prove actual malice when a defamatory statement is of public concern, the Supreme Court in
Gertz terminated the Rosenbloom standard. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346-47 (repudiating
Rosenbloom standard); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971) (plurality
opinion) (all plaintiffs must prove actual malice when statement is of public concern), overruled
by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Supreme Court in Gertz determined
that, in private figure defamation actions, states can establish the defamation standard of
liability for a private figure's actual damages as long as the state does not impose liability
without fault. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. Although the Supreme Court in Gertz allows private
figures in defamation actions to recover actual damages upon showing the press' negligence,
the Supreme Court requires that a private figure must show actual malice before recovering
punitive damages. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
Since Gertz, the Supreme Court has continued to refine constitutional defamation law.
See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1563 (private figure has
burden of showing falsity of defamatory statement), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1784 (1986); Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 512 (1984) (discussing
standards for summary judgment in defamation actions); Wolston v. Readers Digest Ass'n,
443 U.S. 157, 166-67 (1979) (refining definition of "public figure"). Generally, a plaintiff in
a defamation action must prove the defendant's fault, the statement's falsity, and injury to
the plaintiff's reputation. See Philadelphia Newspapers, 106 S. Ct. at 1562-65 (plaintiff in
defamation actions must show fault and falsity); infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text
(discussing proof requirements of reputational injury, falsity, and fault in defamation actions).
12. See, e.g., Keller v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 778 F.2d 711, 715-17 (11th Cir.
1985) (first amendment requires that cartoon depicting unbelievable events is not defamatory);
Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 695 F.2d 438, 440, 442-43 (10th Cir. 1982) (unbelievable story is not
defamatory), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983); Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 893 (2d Cir.
1976) (statements of opinion are not defamatory), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); Loeb v.
Globe Newspaper Co., 489 F. Supp. 481, 486 (D. Mass. 1980) (statement that newspaper was
"worst newspaper in America" is nonactionable opinion); Palm Beach Newspapers v. Early,
334 So. 2d 50, 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (per curiam) (cartoon attacking public official is
not defamatory when cartoon fails to express believable false facts), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
910 (1978); Myers v. Boston Magazine Co., 380 Mass. 336, 342, 403 N.E.2d 376, 379 (1980)
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Although unbelievable satirical comments do not constitute defamatory
statements under the first amendment, recent court decisions have permitted
(humorous nonfactual statement is not defamatory); see also Comment, Fictionalized Publi-
cations: When Should Defamation and Privacy Be A Bar?, 1984 UTAH L. REv. 411, 415 (to
be defamatory, reader reasonably must understand that fictional statement is defamatory). In
determining that the first amendment prohibits individuals from recovering defamation damages
for the press' assertion of unbelievable statements, courts have recognized that defamation
requires a false statement of fact. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40
(1974) (dictum) (requiring false statement of fact in defamation actions); Old Dominion Branch
No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284 (1974) (same); Pring,
695 F.2d at 440 (same); see also Comment, supra, at 413-14 (describing false statement of fact
requirement). Unless a press' statement constitutes a false statement of fact, a plaintiff in a
defamation action cannot establish the defamation proof requirement that the press knowingly
or recklessly published a falsehood. Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 284; see supra note 10
(discussing requirement of knowing disregard of truth in defamation actions).
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, courts have distinguished between
statements of facts and statements of opinion. See, e.g., Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 284
(distinguishing between statements of fact and statements of opinion); Ollman v. Evans, 750
F.2d 970, 974-75 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (same), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); Lewis
v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 552-53 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); Rinsley v. Brandt, 700 F.2d 1304,
1307 (10th Cir. 1983) (same). Courts have relied on the Supreme Court's dicta in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. to find that a statement of pure opinion should receive absolute protection
under the first amendment in defamation actions. See, e.g., Mr. Chow of New York v. Ste.
Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1985) (pure opinion receives absolute first
amendment protection); Olman, 750 F.2d at 975 (same); Lewis, 710 F.2d at 553 (same); see
also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40 (dictum) (statement of opinion should receive absolute first
amendment protection); RSTATEMENT (SECoND) oF TORTS § 566 comment c (1977) (pure
opinion receives absolute protection). The Supreme Court in Gertz recognized that false opinions
or ideas do not exist. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40; see Lewis, 710 F.2d at 553 (citing Gertz for
proposition that false ideas do not exist); Rinsley, 700 F.2d at 1307 (same). Courts have
determined that even rhetorical hyperbole, a nonfactual statement that can serve to attack
viciously particular individuals or groups, should have absolute first amendment protection
when the stated rhetoric does not express believable, false facts. See Greenbelt Coop. Publishing
Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (rhetorical hyperbole that does not express believable
situation does not constitute defamation); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344,
348 (5th Cir. 1966) (phrase "those bastards" did not defame plaintiffs because no reasonable
person would view phrase as expression of fact); see also B. SANTOS, LIBEL AND PRIVACY:
THE PREVENTION OF DEFENSE AND LTIGATION § 5.4.2.2, at 125-29 (1985) (describing types of
rhetorical statements that receive absolute first amendment protection).
Although many courts extend absolute first amendment protection to opinion and rhetoric,
a few courts have distinguished between pure opinion, an opinion based on stated or known
facts, and mixed opinion, an opinion that implies defamatory, unstated facts. See Hoover v.
Peerless Publications, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (jury must decide whether
statement constitutes actionable mixed opinion or nonactionable pure opinion); Pritsker v.
Brudnoy, 389 Mass. 776, -, 452 N.E.2d 227, 228 (1983) (same); Sprouse v. Clay Communica-
tions, Inc., 158 W. Va. 427, 448-49, 211 S.E.2d 674, 690 (false headline injured plaintiff's
reputation), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975); see also REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §
566 comment b (1977) (defining ':pure opinion" and "mixed opinion"); B. SANFoRD, supra,
§ 5.4.2.4, at 132 n.83 (listing courts that found mixed opinion actionable). While courts have
afforded the writers of pure opinion virtually absolute protection under the first amendment
in defamation actions, a writer who defames a plaintiff in a mixed opinion often is accountable
to that plaintiff for defamation. See B. SANFORD, supra, § 5.4, at 113-38 (comparing pure
and mixed opinion); supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing how believable statements
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both public figures13 and private figures 14 to recover damages for the harm
that the publication of satirical comments causes under tort theories other
than defamation." Recently, plaintiffs have attempted to recover damages
printed in humorous context can defame individuals).
Although the Supreme Court has not established a method by which to distinguish fact
from opinion, recent lower court decisions have developed standards by which to determine
whether a statement constitutes fact or opinion. See Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d
1300, 1302-03 (10th Cir. 1985) (describing four-prong test for evaluating whether statement
constitutes opinion), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 272 (1986); Olman, 750 F.2d at 979 (same); infra
notes 147-51 and accompanying text (discussing four-prong test). Generally, the determination
of whether a statement expresses opinion or false facts depends on whether a reader of the
controversial statement could understand the statement to describe actual facts. Pring, 695
F.2d at 440.
13. See R. SACK, supra note 9, at 196-207 (defining "public figure"); B. SANFORD, supra
note 12, § 7.3.1, at 229-30 (same). The importance in distinguishing between public and private
figures results from the Supreme Court's application of different proof requirements for public
figures and private figures in defamation actions. See supra note 11 and accompanying text
(discussing requirement that while public figure and public official in defamation action must
prove actual malice, private figure may have to prove only negligence). The Supreme Court in
Gertz impliedly recognized three types of public figures. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345-51
(discussing types of public figures); B. SANFoRD, supra note 12, § 7.3.1, at 230 (listing three
types of public figures that courts have recognized). The first category of public figures, the
"pervasive" or "all-purpose" public figure, includes individuals who have access to the media
and, by the individuals' conduct or achievement, have invited attention and commentary. See
B. SANroRD, supra note 12, § 7.4.2, at 252 (defining "pervasive" public figures); see also R.
SACK, supra note 9, at 200-01 (listing examples of "pervasive" public figures). The second
type of public figure, the "limited purpose" or "vortex" public figure, is a person who has
placed himself before the public to influence a particular public controversy. See R. SACK,
supra note 9, at 197-98 (defining "vortex" public figures); see also B. SANsoRD, supra note
12, § 7.4.2.2, at 257-69 (illustrating test for determining whether individual is "vortex" public
figure). A third and rare category of public figure is a "nonvoluntary" public figure who,
through notoriety, involuntarily enter a particular public controversy. See B. SANRD, supra
note 12, § 7.4.2.3, at 269-73 (defining "nonvoluntary" public figure). The Supreme Court in
Gertz did not delineate the three categories of public figures to establish definitive prototypes,
but described the three categories merely to illustrate examples of individuals who should
constitute public figures. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343-44 (categories of public figures are merely
generalities); B. SANFoRD, supra note 12, § 7.4.2.1, at 249 (same).
Like public figure plaintiffs, public officials who sue the press for defamation must prove
that the press acted with actual malice. See supra note 11 (discussing actual malice requirement
in defamation actions). A public official is an elected or appointed government employee who
has or appears to have substantial control over or responsibility for government affairs.
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966); see R. SACK, supra note 9, at 189-90 (defining
"public official").
14. See R. SACK, supra note 9, at 193-94 & 205-07 (providing examples of private figure
plaintiffs); see also M. FRANKLIN, supra note 4, at 201-26 (discussing distinctions between
public and private figures); supra note 13 (discussing importance of distinction between public
and private figures).
15. See Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1277 (4th Cir. 1986) (allowing public figure to
recover damages under intentional infliction of emotional distress tort theory), cert. granted
sub nom. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 107 S. Ct. 1601 (1987); Garner v. Triangle
Publications, 97 F. Supp. 546, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (denying summary judgment for invasion
of privacy claim after defendant published fictionalized stories about plaintiff's criminal
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under the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort 16 for nonlibelous
satirical statements that neither convey believable facts nor create reputa-
misconduct); Clifford v. Hollander, 6 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2201, 2202 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980)
(allowing private figure plaintiff to recover damages under intentional infliction of emotional
distress tort theory for distress that publication of humor caused); see also Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976) (allowing private figure plaintiff to recover damages under
false light invasion of privacy theory); Cher v. Forum Int'l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 640 (9th Cir.
1982) (allowing public figure to recover for exploitation of name for commercial purposes),
cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1120 (1983). To recover damages for the harm that the publication of
satirical comments creates, plaintiffs have alleged that the publication of nondefamatory
statements invaded their privacy. See Garner, 97 F. Supp. at 550 (plaintiff alleged invasion of
privacy in publication of nondefamatory material); Clifford, 6 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2202
(plaintiff recovered damages for emotional distress when no defamation existed). The idea of
a "right to privacy" first emerged in a law review article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HRv. L. REv. 193 (1890)
(introducing idea of "right to privacy"). The right to privacy embodies the "right to be let
alone." Id. at 205. Most states currently recognize a tort claim for invasion of privacy, either
by statute or case law. See R. SACK, supra note 9, at 390 (listing states that recognize invasion
of privacy actions). Invasion of privacy theories include public disclosure of private facts,
placing another in a "false light," and appropriation of name or likeness. See infra notes 46-
49 and accompanying text (discussing invasion of privacy theories); see also Hill, Defamation
and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLtrm. L. REv. 1205, 1253-77 (1976) (discussing
invasion of privacy theories that plaintiffs use against press); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L.
Ray. 383, 389 (1960) (discussing categories of invasion of privacy causes of action).
16. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 46 (1965) (defining "intentional infliction of
emotional distress" tort); see also Drechsel, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: New
Tort Liability for Mass Media, 89 DICK. L. REv. 339, 344-45 (1985) (same); Mead, Suing
Media for Emotional Distress: A Multi-Method Analysis of Tort Law Evolution, 23 WASBBURN
L.J. 24, 26-27 (1983) (discussing history and development of intentional infliction of emotional
distress tort); Note, First Amendment Limits on Tort Liability for Words Intended to Inflict
Severe Emotional Distress, 85 CoLum. L. REv. 1749, 1750-51 (1985) (defining "intentional
infliction of emotional distress"). The "intentional infliction of emotional distress" tort, the
"outrage" tort, and the "prima facie" tort have very similar proof requirements and generally
refer to the same tort action. See Kovner, Recent Developments in Intrusion, Private Facts,
False Light, and Commercialization Claims, in 1 ComI ouCATIONs LAw 1985, at 465, 503
(PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Handbook Series No. 210)
(courts use different terms to refer to same tort action). The Restatement (Second) of Torts
defines the intentional infliction of emotional distress as "extreme and outrageous conduct
[that] intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). In an intentional infliction of emotional distress tort action,
a plaintiff must establish four elements. See Note, supra, at 1750-51. An intentional infliction
of emotional distress plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct was extreme and
outrageous, that the defendant intentionally or recklessly caused emotional distress, that the
suffered emotional distress was severe, and that the defendant's conduct caused the emotional
distress. See id. (discussing elements in intentional infliction of emotional distress action).
Although a plaintiff in an intentional infliction of emotional distress action theoretically must
prove all four elements, the proof requirement of outrageous conduct usually is the determi-
native factor in most intentional infliction of emotional distress actions. See Drechsel, supra,
at 345 (outrageous conduct is most important element in emotional distress action); Note,
supra, at 1751 (outrageous conduct is central, if not only, element of emotional distress action).
A court often will infer that the remaining elements exist upon a showing of highly outrageous
conduct. See Note, supra, at 1751 (discussing courts that, after finding outrageous conduct in
intentional infliction of emotional distress action, inferred existence of remaining elements).
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tional injury. 7 Courts that allow plaintiffs to recover damages for emotional
distress resulting from nondefamatory satire often have not applied first
amendment defamation protections to claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress.' Although plaintiffs who plead the intentional infliction
of emotional distress tort generally must prove injury 9 and intent, 0 the
17. See, e.g., Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1272 (4th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff alleged that
intentional infliction of emotional distress arose from nondefamatory satire), cert. granted sub
nom. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 107 S. Ct. 1601 (1987); Pring v. Penthouse Int'l,
Inc., 695 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir. 1982) (discussing plaintiff's allegation that defendant
intentionally caused emotional distress by publishing satirical story), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1132 (1983); Martin v. Municipal Publications, 510 F. Supp. 255, 260 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (plaintiff
alleged that defendant intentionally caused emotional distress by publishing satirical caption
below plaintiff's picture); see also Ross v. Bums, 612 F.2d 271, 272 (6th Cir. 1980) (defendant
counterclaimed that plaintiff intentionally inflicted emotional distress by publishing nude
photographs of defendant); Koch v. Goldway, 607 F. Supp. 223, 224 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (plaintiff
alleged that defendant intentionally inflicted emotional distress by printing editorial about
plaintiff); Pierson v. News Group Publications, 549 F. Supp. 635, 642-43 (S.D. Ga. 1982)
(plaintiff alleged that defendant intentionally inflicted emotional distress by printing embar-
rassing pictures of plaintiff). Although plaintiffs in both intentional infliction of emotional
distress tort actions and defamation actions must prove the defendant's fault, the elements of
a traditional intentional infliction of emotional distress tort action differ from the elements of
a defamation action. See Drechsel, supra note 16, at 350 (emotional distress tort differs
substantially from defamation tort); Mead, supra note 16, at 27 (same); supra note 16 (defining
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress). The intentional infliction of emotional
distress tort has fewer elements than a defamation action, protects a victim's emotional rather
than reputational interests, and focuses more clearly on the defendant's actual conduct. Mead,
supra note 16, at 27; see Drechsel, supra note 16, at 350-52 (discussing differences between
defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress); supra note 16 (defining tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress).
18. See Martin v. Municipal Publications, 510 F. Supp. 255, 260 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(publishing satirical caption could be outrageous and extreme conduct, even absent defamation);
see also Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303, 308 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984) (first amendment does not protect intentional infliction of emotional distress);
Note, supra note 16, at 1753 (first amendment rarely considered in intentional infliction of
emotional distress actions). One commentator has noted that, although some courts considering
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims address first amendment issues, the majority
of courts rule for the defendant on common law principles and, therefore, do not expressly
apply the first amendment to the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort. See Drechsel,
supra note 16, at 348-50 (discussing courts' application of first amendment principles to
intentional infliction of emotional distress tort actions).
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1965) (discussing injury
requirement in intentional infliction of emotional distress actions); see also supra note 16
(discussing proof requirements in intentional infliction of emotional distress actions). In proving
injury in an intentional infliction of emotional distress tort action, a plaintiff must show that
the plaintiff actually suffered severe emotional distress as a result of the defendant's actions.
See Note, supra note 16, at 1750 (discussing injury requirement of intentional infliction of
emotional distress tort). Liability results only when the suffered emotional distress is so extreme
that no reasonable man could endure the distress. RESTATE ENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46
comment j (1965); see Drechsel, supra note 16, at 346 (discussing severe injury requirement in
intentional infliction of emotional distress actions). Although resulting bodily harm, such as
shock or illness, is not a prerequisite to recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress tort, a defendant whose intentional actions cause bodily harm will be liable for both
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United States Supreme Court never expressly has attached first amendment
protections to the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort.21 Because
the Supreme Court has not applied first amendment protections to inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress actions, courts often do not require
that a plaintiff pleading intentional infliction of emotional distress meet the
the emotional distress and the resulting bodily harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
comment j (1965). To recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must
prove that severe distress occurred. Id. Although embarrassment, anger, worry, or disappoint-
ment may be severe, mental distress that causes only minor discomfort is not a basis for
liability. Drechsel, supra note 16, at 345-46. A plaintiff in an intentional infliction of emotional
distress action, however, can use the extreme and outrageous nature of the defendant's conduct
to infer the existence of severe emotional distress. Id. at 346; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46 comment j (1965) (outrageousness is evidence of injury).
In defining the "outrageous" element of an intentional infliction of emotional distress
action, the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that outrageous conduct exists when an average
member of a community, after hearing about a defendant's conduct, would exclaim, "Out-
rageous!" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965); see Drechsel, supra note
16, at 345 (listing examples of outrageous conduct). Additionally, nonoutrageous conduct may
become outrageous if the defendant knew of the plaintiff's special sensitivity to the defendant's
injurious conduct. Dreschel, supra note 16, at 345.
20. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoNlD) OF TORTS § 46 comment i (1965) (plaintiff can recover
for intentional infliction of emotional distress when actor intended to inflict severe emotional
distress); see also supra note 16 (discussing elements of intentional infliction of emotional
distress tort). A plaintiff can recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress after
proving that the defendant intended to cause severe emotional distress, or deliberately disre-
garded a substantial probability that the plaintiff's severe emotional distress would result.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment i (1965). Because the defendant's intent to
injure the plaintiff is an element of the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort, a
plaintiff in an intentional infliction of emotional distress tort action must prove the defendant's
fault in publishing a statement. See Drechsel, supra note 16, at 345 (emotional distress tort
requires fault). The fault standard in intentional infliction of emotional distress actions,
however, differs from the fault standards in defamation actions. See supra note 11 (discussing
first amendment fault standards in defamation actions). For example, while a public figure
plaintiff in a defamation action must prove that the press knowingly or recklessly published
a false statement, an emotional distress plaintiff must prove that the press intended to harm
emotionally the plaintiff by publishing either a false or true statement. See Mead, supra note
16, at 52-53 (comparing fault requirements in defamation and emotional distress actions).
Compare supra note 11 (discussing defamation fault standards) with RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 46 comment i (1965) (discussing intentional infliction of emotional distress fault
standard).
21. See Rich & Brilliant, supra note 2, at 18-19 (Supreme Court has not resolved question
of whether first amendment protections apply to all privacy actions); see also Drechsel, supra
note 16, at 351-52 (courts do not universally apply first amendment to intentional infliction
of emotional distress tort); Note, supra note 16, at 1753 (few courts considering intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims have applied first amendment considerations to tort).
But see Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 695 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir. 1982) (applying first amendment
considerations to intentional infliction of emotional distress tort), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132
(1983); Ault v. Hustler Magazine, 13 MEDiA L. REP. (BNA) 1657, 1662-63 (D. Or. 1986)
(same); Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Television Corp., 436 So. 2d 328, 330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (same); Boyles v. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 431 So. 2d 627, 636 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (same), aff'd, 467 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1985).
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first amendment defamation fault standard- or prove the injurious state-
ment's falsity,23 proof standards that the Supreme Court requires in defa-
mation tort actions.24 The availability of the intentional infliction of emotional
distress tort claim in situations that do not involve libelous2 satire circum-
vents the media protections that the Supreme Court has established in
defamation actions, particularly when courts allow public figures to recover
damages for emotional distress. 26 By imposing economic accountability on
satirists for the emotional distress that a public figure endures from the
publication of nondefamatory satire, courts will discourage satirists from
expressing any opinion that might cause a public figure to experience any
distress.
27
Although the Supreme Court never expressly has attached first amend-
ment protections to the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort, the
Supreme Court, to encourage the free expression of ideas, has established
strong first amendment protections for the press' statements in defamation
actions. 2 Recognizing in 1964 that common-law defamation proof standards
provided inadequate protection for the press,29 the Supreme Court, in New
22. See supra note 11 (discussing first amendment fault standard in defamation actions);
infra notes 39 & 42 and accompanying text (discussing first amendment actual malice standard
in defamation actions).
23. See infra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing requirement that defamatory
statement must be false).
24. See supra note 11 (discussing first amendment fault requirement in defamation
actions); infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional proof requirements
in defamation actions).
25. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 825 (5th ed. 1979) (defining "libelous" as "defamatory");
see also R. SACK, supra note 9, at 43 (defining "libel"); supra note 9 (defining "libel").
26. See B. SANroPD, supra note 12, § 11.3.4, at 455 (proof requirements in intentional
infliction of emotional distress actions ignore first amendment protections); Note, supra note
16, at 1778-83 (allowing public figure to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress
circumvents first amendment defamation law); infra notes 154-56, 166-72 and accompanying
text (same); see also infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (discussing first amendment
protections that apply in defamation actions).
27. See Note, supra note 16, at 1758-61, 1785 (courts that allow plaintiffs to recover for
intentional infliction of emotional distress create danger of censorship of unpopular ideas);
supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's attempts to encourage
free expression of ideas). -
28. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 259, 279-80 (1964) (requiring courts
to apply first amendment protection to press' publications in defamation actions); supra note
11 (discussing first amendment standards that courts must apply in defamation actions); infra
notes 36-44 and accompanying text (same).
29. See C. Moxuus, supra note 11, at 5 (under common law, plaintiffs in defamation
actions could recover substantial damages without proof of fault or loss); B. SANFoRD, supra
note 12, § 6.2.1, at 162 (under common law, falsity of defamatory statement was not genuine
prerequisite to liability); Note, supra note 12, at 429-30 (common-law defamation afforded
media defendants little protection). Under the common law, the Supreme Court did not require
that courts attach first amendment considerations to defamation actions. Comment, Hepps v.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.: The Validity of the Common Law Presumption of Falsity in
Light of New York Times and its Progeny, 61 NoT"E DAME LAW. 125, 130 (1986). Under the
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York Times v. Sullivan,30 determined that, because the public can benefit
from an uninhibited press, the first amendment freedom of the press must
apply to defamation actions, at least if the plaintiff is a public official.3'
The first amendment provides that Congress shall not enact a law that will
curtail freedom of the press.32 The first amendment, however, does not
common law, a plaintiff in a defamation action had to plead at least four elements. See
Comment, supra, at 128 (describing common-law proof requirements in defamation actions).
First, a plaintiff had to plead that the defendant had communicated a statement of fact to a
third party. Id.; see N. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN 5 (1986) (under common law,
defamatory statement was nonactionable unless third party heard statement); supra note 12
(distinguishing statements of fact and opinion). Second, a defamation plaintiff had to plead
that the communicated item was defamatory. See Comment, supra, at 128 & n.17 (describing
defamatory statement requirement); supra note 9 (defining "defamation"). Third, a plaintiff
in a defamation action had to show that the communicated item was "of and concerning"
the plaintiff. See Comment, supra, at 128 & n.18 (describing defamation requirement that
communicated statement concerned plaintiff). Last, the plaintiff had to plead that the com-
municated item was false. See id. at 128-29 (describing falsity requirement).
Although the plaintiff in a common law defamation action had to plead that a defamatory
statement was false, the defamed plaintiff did not necessarily have to prove the statement's
falsity. Comment, supra, at 129. Under the common law, courts presumed that a communicated
defamatory statement was false. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 581A comment b, at
235-36 (1977) (explaining common-law presumption of falsity); Comment, supra, at 129 & n.
21 (same). Although truth was an absolute defense in common-law defamation actions, courts
placed the burden of proving a defamatory statement's truth on the defendant. See Sack,
Common Law Libel and the Press-A Primer, in I CommouNIcATIONs LAW 1985, at 1, 29 (PLI
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Handbook Series No. 210) (under
common law, defendant in defamation action had to prove truth of defamatory statement);
Comment, supra, at 129 (at common law, burden of proving truth was on press). But see
Krutech v. Schimmel, 27 A.D.2d 837, 837, 278 N.Y.S.2d 25, 26 (1966) (plaintiff in common-
law defamation action must prove statement's falsity when defendant has qualified privilege);
Comment, supra, at 129 & nn.23-24 (under common law, defendant could escape liability for
untrue defamatory statement by proving existence of privilege). Because the press sometimes
had difficulty in overcoming the common law presumption of a defamatory statement's falsity,
a speaker of a true statement conceivably could be liable for defamation. See B. SANFORD,
supra note 12, § 6.2.1, at 162 (under common-law defamation, falsity of defamatory statement
was not always prerequisite to liability).
In addition to creating the possibility that plaintiffs in common-law defamation actions
might recover defamation damages for true statements, courts under the common law allowed
plaintiffs to succeed in defamation actions against defendants who had not exhibited any fault.
See C. MoRais, supra note 11, at 5 (under common law, person who innocently made
defamatory statement could be liable for defamation). In the majority of courts, fault was
not an element of common-law defamation. See C. LAWIHoRE, DEFAMATION AND PUBLIC
OFicLAis: Tm EvoLvINo LAW OF LIBEL 129 (1971) (describing common-law majority view of
fault); C. MoRuus, supra, at 5-6 (same). If the press published a statement that the press
honestly believed was true, a court still could impose liability on the press for defamation if
later investigation proved that the statement was false. See Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59
F. 530, 540-41 (6th Cir. 1893) (press is liable for false statement even though press, after
making careful investigation, thought that statement was true). But see C. LAWIORNE, supra,
at 152 (describing minority court view that honest belief in statement's truth defeated common
law defamation claim).
30. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
31. Id. at 279.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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provide the press with an absolute protection against defamation actions. 33
Although some commentators have argued that the Constitution grants the
first amendment freedom of the press without qualification, 34 the Supreme
Court, recognizing that the freedom of the press is not absolute, requires
courts considering defamation actions to balance the press' freedom to
publish against an individual's reputational interests. 35
To provide a balance between the freedom of the press and an individ-
ual's reputational interests, the Supreme Court has devised constitutional
standards for courts to apply in defamation actions. 6 The Court requires
that, for a plaintiff to recover for defamation, the plaintiff must establish
that the published statement injured the plaintiff's reputation,37 that the
published statement was false,38 and that the publisher acted with some
33. See supra note 5 (first amendment protections are not absolute); supra note 11
(discussing proof requirements in defamation actions); infra notes 36-44 and accompanying
text (same).
34. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing commentators' argument that
Constitution grants absolute first amendment rights).
35. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's interest bal-
ancing in first amendment cases); see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80 (1964) (granting press first amendment protection in public official defamation actions
except when public official proves actual malice).
36. See supra note 11 (describing constitutional first amendment standards for defamation
actions); see, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2514 (1986) (requiring
plaintiffs in defamation actions to show actual malice with "clear and convincing evidence"
at summary judgment stage of trial); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct.
1558, 1563-64 (private figure plaintiff has burden of showing defamatory statement's falsity),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1784 (1986); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-54 (1976)
(restricting definition of public figure); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974)
(states may develop fault standards for private figure defamation actions); Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 264-65 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring) (to recover for defamation,
public figures must prove that press published defamatory statement with actual malice);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964) (public official in defamation action must prove
falsity of defamatory statements); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1964) (to recover for defamation, public officials must prove that press published defamatory
statements with actual malice).
37. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (requiring defamatory
statement in defamation action); B. SAreoRD, supra note 12, § 4.2, at 76 (1985) (discussing
reputational injury requirement in defamation actions).
38. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1564 (requiring private
figure plaintiffs in defamation actions to prove defamatory statements' falsity), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1784 (1986); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (requiring public figure
plaintiffs in defamation actions to prove defamatory statements' falsity). Under common-law
defamation, courts often required a defendant in a defamation action to prove that the defend-
ant's allegedly defamatory statement was true. See Trahan v. Ritterman, 368 So. 2d 181, 184
(La. Ct. App. 1979) (requiring defendant to prove truth of defamatory statement); Memphis
Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412, 420 (Tenn. 1978) (discussing common-law as-
sumption that defamatory statement was untrue). Plaintiffs in common-law defamation actions
did not have to show that allegedly defamatory statements were false and, therefore, conceivably
could recover damages for the publication of true statements if defendants could not prove
the truth of the statements. B. SAN~oRD, supra note 12, at 161-62. In Garrison v. Louisiana,
however, the United States Supreme Court held that, if a published statement concerned a
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degree of fault. 9 In determining the degree of fault that a defendant must
exhibit before a plaintiff can succeed in a defamation action, courts first
distinguish between "public figure" plaintiffs and "private figure" plain-
tiffs.40 The Supreme Court has distinguished between public and private
figures by recognizing that a public figure voluntarily has "thrusted" himself
before the public to influence the outcome of particular public issues, but
that a private figure has not.41 While states can allow private figures to
recover damages after showing that the press negligently published a defam-
atory statement, the Court requires that if a plaintiff is a public figure, the
plaintiff must establish that the press published the allegedly defamatory
statement with "actual malice," a knowing or reckless disregard of the
truth.4 2 Although the actual malice standard does not provide the press with
an absolute privilege to print any falsehood about a public figure, public
figures have difficulty in overcoming the strict actual malice proof standard,
as well as the reputational injury and falsity proof requirements.43 The first
amendment protections that the Court has adopted in defamation actions
substantially have protected the press by reducing the likelihood that public
public figure plaintiff, the public figure must show that the published statement was false.
Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74. Additionally, in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, the
Supreme Court determined that a private figure plaintiff must prove an allegedly defamatory
statement's falsity if the statement involves a matter of public concern. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at
1564; see B. SANFoRD, supra note 12, at 170 n.71 (listing courts that required plaintiff to
prove falsity prior to Hepps). Although the Court in Hepps requires private figure plaintiffs
to prove defamatory statements' falsity if the statements involve a matter of public concern,
the Court did not expressly extend the burden of proving falsity to all private figure plaintiffs.
See Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1563 (limiting decision to statements that involve matters of public
concern). Courts, therefore, still may be able to require defendants in defamation actions
affirmatively to prove the truth of defamatory statements if those statements involve private
figures and do not involve matters of public concern. See id. But see In re IBP Confidential
Business Documents Litig., 797 F.2d 632, 647-48 (8th Cir. 1986) (implying that, under Hepps,
all private figure plaintiffs must prove falsity of defamatory statements).
39. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (states can establish fault
standards for private figure plaintiffs in defamation actions); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (public figure plaintiffs in defamation actions must show that media
defendants acted with knowing or reckless disregard of truth); supra note 11 (discussing
constitutional fault standards for defamation actions).
40. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348 (permitting different proof standards for public and
private figure plaintiffs in defamation actions); supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text
(differentiating between public and private figures); supra note 11 (describing different fault
standards for private and public figures).
41. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45; see supra note 13 (describing types of public figures).
42. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48 (allowing states to develop different fault standards
for private figures and public figures); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164-65
(1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring) (requiring public figures to meet actual malice fault standard);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (requiring public officials to
meet actual malice fault standard); supra note 11 (defining "actual malice").
43. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (establishing actual
malice standard as proof requirement in public official defamation actions); B. SANFORD, supra
note 12, § 8.1, at 285 (recognizing difficulty that public figures have in meeting actual malice
standard); supra note 13 (defining "public figure").
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figure plaintiffs can succeed in defamation suits against the press. 44
Although the Supreme Court has established strict proof requirements
in public figure defamation actions, numerous courts recently have allowed
both private and public figure plaintiffs to recover damages on causes of
action other than defamation. 41 When a statement allegedly injures a plain-
tiff's reputation, many plaintiffs in defamation actions plead not only
defamation in violation of the first amendment, but also one or more
invasion of privacy tort claims,"6 including public disclosure of private
facts, 47 appropriation of name or likeness, 4 and "false light" invasion of
privacy.49 Plaintiffs often have attempted to bypass the strict proof require-
ments of traditional first amendment defamation actions by pleading one
or more of these alternative causes of action.50 For example, in Time, Inc.
44. See B. SANFORD, supra note 12, § 8.1, at 285 (public figures have difficulty in
winning defamation suits); Appeals Court Libel Ruling Hailed As Investigative Journalism
Victory, Washington Post, March 14, 1987, § A, at 9, col. 1 (same).
45. See Rich & Brilliant, supra note 2, at 15 (plaintiffs increasingly plead alternative
causes of action); supra note 15 (discussing alternative causes of action).
46. See, e.g., Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 695 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir. 1982) (discussing
plaintiff's claims for libel, "false light" invasion of privacy, and "outrageous conduct"), cert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983); Ross v. Bums, 612 F.2d 271, 272 (6th Cir. 1980) (defendant
counterclaimed for invasion of privacy and emotional distress); Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d
636, 637 (2d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff alleged libel and various privacy invasions); Ault v. Hustler,
Inc., 13 MEDIA L. RaP. (BNA) 1657, 1658 (D. Or. 1986) (same); Koch v. Goldway, 607 F.
Supp. 223 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (plaintiff alleged libel and emotional distress); Cibenko v. Worth
Publishers, Inc., 510 F. supp. 761, 764 (D.N.J. 1981) (plaintiff alleged libel and "false light"
invasion of privacy); see supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing and defining invasion
of privacy tort theory).
47. See Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 808 (2d Cir.) (plaintiff alleged-
public disclosure of private facts), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940); Branson v. Fawcett
Publications, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 429, 430 (E.D. Ill. 1954) (same); REsTATE ENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTs § 652D (1977) (defining "public disclosure of private facts" tort); R. SACK, supra note
9, at 402 (same).
48. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) (allowing
plaintiff to recover for press' broadcast of plaintiff's entertainment act); Friedan v. Friedan,
414 F. Supp. 77, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (plaintiff alleged appropriation of plaintiff's picture);
see also RmATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTs § 652C (1977) (defining "appropriation of name or
likeness" tort); R. SACK, supra note 9, at 439-40 (same).
49. See, e.g., Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 695 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir. 1982) (discussing
plaintiff's claims for libel, "false light" invasion of privacy, and "outrageous conduct"), cert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983); Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 637 (2d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff
alleged libel and various privacy invasions); Ault v. Hustler, Inc., 13 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA)
1657, 1658 (D. Or. 1986) (same); Cibenko v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 761, 764
(D.N.J. 1981) (plaintiff alleged libel and "false light" invasion of privacy); Martin v. Municipal
Publications, 510 F. Supp. 255, 259 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (same); see also R. SACK, supra note 9,
at 393-94 (defining "false light" invasion of privacy). The "false light" invasion of privacy
action protects an individual's interest in emotional stability. R. SACK, supra note 9, at 393.
The "false light" cause of action differs from defamation in that, while plaintiffs in "false
light" actions recover for injured feelings, defamation plaintiffs recover for injured reputation.
Id. To recover for "false light" invasion of privacy, a plaintiff must show that the defendant
made a public statement about the plaintiff that was substantially and materially false. Id.
50. See Mead, supra note 16, at 31 (discussing cases in which plaintiffs attempted to
avoid defamation proof requirements).
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v. Hill5 1 the Supreme Court considered whether the first amendment permits
a plaintiff to recover for invasion of privacy when a press statement places
the plaintiff in a "false light" but does not defame the plaintiff.52 In Hill,
the New York Court of Appeals affirmed a jury's finding of liability against
the defendant under the "false light" invasion of privacy theory after the
defendant published an untrue story which stated that a new play depicted
the plaintiff's escape from convict captors.5 3 The Supreme Court in Hill
defined "false light" invasion of privacy as the use of a person's name or
picture as the subject of a fictitious report or article . 4 The Supreme Court
in Hill recognized that a state, through statutory law, could create and
enforce a "false light" invasion of privacy tort action to provide plaintiffs
with an alternative to the defamation cause of action in suits concerning
the press' publication of inaccurate statements. 5 The Supreme Court in
Hill, however, determined that a state statute violates the first amendment
if the statute allows a plaintiff to recover for invasion of privacy without
requiring the plaintiff to prove that the media defendant acted with actual
malice, the knowing or reckless publication of a falsehood.16 The Supreme
Court in Hill, therefore, found that the same first amendment considerations
that require a plaintiff to prove actual malice in defamation actions also
require a plaintiff to prove actual malice in invasion of privacy actions
against the press.
5 7
Although the Supreme Court in Hill recognized that plaintiffs in invasion
of privacy actions must prove the press' fault in publishing a defamatory
statement, the Supreme Court has not expressly required that a plaintiff in
51. 385 U.S. 374 (1966).
52. Id. at 387-88.
53. Id. at 379-80. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, the plaintiffs complained that Life, a magazine
published by defendant Time, Inc. (Time), falsely reported that a fictionalized play reenacted
the plaintiff's family's struggle to escape from the family's captors. Id. at 377. The plaintiff
stated that, while escaped convicts detained the plaintiff-and his family, the escaped convicts
had treated the plaintiff courteously and had released the plaintiff and his family without
harm. Id. at 378. The play that Life described, however, portrayed a family that captors had
treated violently. Id.
The plaintiff in Hill brought an action against Time for portraying the plaintiff's experience
in a "false light." Id. at 376-77. A New York statute allowed plaintiffs to recover for invasion
of privacy if a person, firm, or corporation used the plaintiff's name for advertising or
trade purposes. Id. at 376 n.1; see N.Y. Civ. Rioars LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976)
(establishing limited cause of action for invasion of privacy). The Supreme Court, however,
determined that New York courts had construed the statute broadly to allow recovery for
numerous privacy invasions. Id. at 381-82.
54. Hill, 385 U.S. at 384. In defining "false light" invasion of privacy, the Supreme
Court in Hill accepted the definition of "false light" in the New York privacy statute upon
which the plaintiff had based his suit. Id.; see N.Y. Civ. Ri(HTs LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney
1976) (establishing limited cause of action for invasion of privacy). The Court recognized that
truth was a complete defense to the New York statute's "false light" invasion of privacy
action. Hill, 376 U.S. at 382-83.
55. Hill, 385 U.S. at 384-85 n. 9.




an invasion of privacy action always must prove that the injurious statement
was false before recovering damages.5 8 The Supreme Court, however, in-
creasingly has expanded application of the defamation falsity requirement
to invasion of privacy actions that deal with harm inflicted by published
statements. 9 For example, in Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn,60 the Supreme
Court considered whether plaintiffs can recover for invasion of privacy
when the media discloses true statements. 6' In Cox Broadcasting, the father
of a deceased rape victim sued a media defendant on an invasion of privacy
claim for publicly announcing the rape victim's name. 62 The Court in Cox
Broadcasting, recognizing that the public relies on the press to inform
society about facts and events,63 held that the courts could not punish the
press for publishing truthful information obtained from public court rec-
ords.64 Although the Court in Cox Broadcasting limited its decision to the
publication of truthful information about private figures, the Court, in
dictum, recognized a more substantial right for the press against public
figures in invasion of privacy actions.6s The Court in Cox Broadcasting
recognized that a statement's truth is an absolute defense against public
figures in privacy invasion actions when the published information is a
matter of public interest. 66 Because courts generally recognize that infor-
58. See Rich & Brilliant, supra note 2, at 18-19 (recognizing that Supreme Court has
not determined whether first amendment standards apply to all invasion of privacy actions);
see also Drechsel, supra note 16, at 351-52 (courts inconsistently apply first amendment
standards to privacy actions).
59. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) (barring state from
punishing newspaper for publishing truthful information legally obtained); Cox Broadcasting
Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 490 (1975) (prohibiting punishment for publishing true information
obtained from public records); Hill, 385 U.S. at 382-83 (stressing importance of complete
defense of truth in "false light" privacy action); see also supra note 38 and accompanying
text (discussing falsity requirement in defamation actions).
60. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
61. See id. at 490-96 (considering whether plaintiff can recover for defendant's publication
of true information that press defendant received from open public records).
62. Id. at 471, 474. In Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, a reporter covered a rape trial
in which the rape victim had died. Id. at 472. The reporter discovered the name of the rape
victim, the plaintiff's daughter, by examining public records. Id. The television station for
which the reporter had covered the story publicly named the plaintiff's daughter as the rape
victim. Id. at 473-74. The rape victim's father sued the television station for invasion of the
plaintiff's right to privacy. Id.
63. Id. at 491-92.
64. Id. at 490. In Cox Broadcasting, the United States Supreme Court stated that the
first amendment requires that truth must act as an absolute defense against privacy actions
brought by public officials and public figures, at least when the published information concerns
a matter of public interest. Id. In considering private figure plaintiffs, however, the Supreme
Court limited its decision to deciding that private figures could not recover damages in a
privacy action for the publication of nondefamatory, truthful information contained in official
court records. Id. at 496.
65. See id. at 489-90 (dictum) (recognizing that public figure cannot recover privacy
damages for publication of truthful information that concerns matter of public interest).
66. Id. at 490.
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mation about a public figure's life is a matter of public interest,67 the Court,
through dictum in Cox Broadcasting, appears to give the press a stringent
defense against invasion of privacy actions brought by public figures for
the publication of truthful information.
68
Although Supreme Court decisions suggest that public figure plaintiffs
must establish falsity and actual malice to recover for invasion of privacy,
some courts recently have allowed plaintiffs to circumvent first amendment
defamation proof requirements by permitting plaintiffs to plead the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress tort. 69 When courts first recognized
the viability of the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort, courts
permitted plaintiffs to recover damages for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress only after a court had found the defendant liable under
a traditional tort claim, such as assault or battery. 70 Gradually, courts began
to allow plaintiffs to claim emotional distress as an independent tort when
the harm that the plaintiffs suffered failed to fall into any traditional tort
claim. 71 Increasingly, plaintiffs alleging that emotional distress resulted from
a press publication have pleaded the intentional infliction of emotional
distress tort as an independent cause of action in defamation and privacy
tort actions. 72 If a court, using first amendment proof standards, finds that
the printed material is defamatory, the court traditionally allows a defamed
plaintiff to recover damages not only for reputational injury, but also for
the emotional distress that results from a defamatory statement.73 If a court
67. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345, 351 (1974) (public
information about "all-purpose public figure" extends to all contexts of public figure's life);
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 274, 277 (1971) (information of public interest
reaches far beyond customary meaning of "official conduct"); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 77 (1964) (recognizing that any information affecting public official's fitness for
office is matter of public interest, notwithstanding that information might intrude on public
official's private life); B. SANFORD, supra note 12, § 7.2.4, at 225-26 (courts apply liberal
standard in determining whether information about public official is of public interest); supra
note 13 (defining public figure).
68. See Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 490 (recognizing press privilege to publish truthful
information about public figure).
69. See Parnell v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 909, 920-21 (W.D. Mich. 1983)
(refusing to apply first amendment defamation privilege to intentional infliction of emotional
distress action); Apostle v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 897, 908-09 (W.D. Mich.
1983) (same); Mead, supra note 16, at 31 (discussing cases in which courts allowed plaintiffs
to recover emotional distress damages when defendant had not made defamatory statements);
supra note 16 (discussing elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress tort).
70. See Mead, supra note 16, at 38 n.20 (listing cases in which courts attached parasitically
emotional distress damages to defamation damages).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Ross v. Burns, 612 F.2d 271, 272 (6th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff alleged privacy
invasion and intentional infliction of emotional distress); Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 13
MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1657, 1658 (D. Or. 1986) (plaintiff claimed libel, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and numerous privacy invasions); Koch v. Goldway, 607 F. Supp. 223,
224 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (plaintiff claimed defamation and intentional infliction of emotional
distress).
73. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (in defamation action,
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determines that a statement is not defamatory, a court that allows a plaintiff
to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress without re-
quiring that the plaintiff prove actual malice and falsity ignores the first
amendment protections of the freedom of the press that the Supreme Court
established in New York Times.74 In a defamation action, the Supreme
Court, under the New York Times first amendment standards, requires that
a plaintiff prove a defamatory statement's falsity before recovering for
defamation.7 The traditional definition of the intentional infliction of
emotional distress tort, however, does not require explicitly that the pub-
lished statements be false before a plaintiff can recover.
76
In addition to some courts' failure to require falsity in emotional distress
actions, courts apply varying fault standards in emotional distress cases.
77
Some courts, attaching first amendment fault standards to emotional distress
actions, require plaintiffs to prove that the press published a statement with
actual malice. 78 The traditional proof requirements for intentional infliction
of emotional distress actions, however, rely on common-law principles, and
do not embody the first amendment protections that defamation law re-
quires. 79 Most definitions of the intentional infliction of emotional distress
tort require only that a plaintiff prove that a defendant intentionally or
plaintiff receives damages for reputational injury, personal humiliation, and mental distress);
Schrottman v. Boston Globe, 7 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1487, 1488 (Mass. 1981) (awarding
plaintiff in defamation action damages for reputational injury and mental anguish); Hill, supra
note 15, at 1252 (describing damages that defamed plaintiffs receive in defamation actions).
74. See Mead, supra note 16, at 28 (describing erratic application of first amendment
standards in intentional infliction of emotional distress cases).
75. See supra note 38 (plaintiffs in defamation actions generally must prove falsity of
defamatory statements).
76. Drechsel, supra note 16, at 349; see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965)
(describing requirements in intentional infliction of emotional distress actions); supra note 16
(same). But see Lerette v. Dean Witter Org., Inc., 60 Cal. App. 3d 573, 579, 131 Cal. Rptr.
592, 595-96 (1976) (if defamation claim fails, intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim based on same nondefamatory statement also must fail); Williams v. New York Times,
10 MEDiA L. REP. (BNA) 1494, 1495 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1984) (prohibiting liability for publishing
true statements).
77. See Mead, supra note 16, at 28 (courts apply varying fault standards in intentional
infliction of emotional distress actions). Compare Martin v. Municipal Publications, 510 F.
Supp. 255, 260 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (applying common law standards to intentional infliction of
emotional distress case) with Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 151, 169 Cal. Rptr.
701, 716 (1980) (applying first amendment standards to intentional infliction of emotional
distress case).
78. Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 147, 151, 162 Cal. Rptr. 701, 714, 716
(1980) (requiring plaintiff to prove actual malice to recover for intentional infliction of
emotional distress); see Williams v. New York Times, 10 MEDiA L. REP. (BNA) 1494, 1495
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 1984) (attaching first amendment protection to intentional infliction of emotional
distress action); Drechsel, supra note 16, at 349 n.67 (discussing court that applied actual
malice standard to intentional infliction of emotional distress tort).
79. Drechsel, supra note 16, at 351-52; see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text
(discussing different proof requirements in defamation actions and intentional infliction of
emotional distress actions).
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recklessly caused severe emotional distress through outrageous conduct.8 0
This definition of the intentional infliction of emotional distress creates
particular problems for satirical writers and cartoonists." The "intentional"
standard that the emotional distress tort requires strongly resembles the
common-law "ill will" fault standard that the Supreme Court in New York
Times specifically rejected. 2 Additionally, because one purpose of satire is
to make readers uncomfortable about accepted political and social trends,
satirists may be liable under the "outrageous" standard when the satire
succeeds in meeting the satirist's intended goal of invoking discomfort.
Although most cases in which courts have found a media defendant
liable under the common-law definition of intentional infliction of emotional
distress have involved private figure plaintiffs, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Falwell v. Flynt,84 recently allowed a
public figure plaintiff to recover damages for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress after the public figure failed to succeed on a libel claim.8 5
In Falwell, Hustler Magazine, Inc. (Hustler) published a satirical "ad
parody" involving Jerry Falwell, a nationally known fundamentalist min-
ister, in two separate issues of Hustler magazine.86 The parody imitated a
nationally circulated advertisement that used double entendres to intimate
a relationship between a celebrity's first sexual experience and first exposure
to the advertiser's product.8 7 The Hustler parody described Falwell's first
sexual encounter as an incestuous relationship with his mother. The mag-
azine, however, printed a disclaimer with the parody which stated that
80. See Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974) (describing
proof requirements in intentional infliction of emotional distress cases); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 46 (1965) (same); see also Martin v. Municipal Publications, 510 F. Supp. 255,
260 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (citing section 46 of RESTATEMENT).
81. See Dorsen, supra note 1, at 926-28 (describing problems for satirists when little
protection exists for controversial statements).
82. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73-74 (1964) (proof that defendant acted
with "ill will" against plaintiff does not constitute actual malice); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (public official plaintiff in defamation action must prove
that press knowingly or recklessly published falsehood); Drechsel, supra note 16, at 351
(describing differences in defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress fault
standards); supra note 11 (defining "actual malice").
83. See Dorsen, supra note 1, at 927 (good satire often causes hurt feelings); Mead,
supra note 16, at 28 (courts inconsistently apply proof standards in emotional distress actions);
Note, supra note 16, at 1777-78 (discussing probability that courts will impose liability under
intentional infliction of emotional distress tort for offensive humorous ideas).
84. 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub nom. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 107 S. Ct. 1601 (1987).
85. Id. at 1277.
86. See id. at 1272 (discussing parody published in Hustler magazine).
87. See id. (describing Hustler's ad parody).
88. See id. In Falwell v. Flynt, the ad parpdy that was the basis of Falwell's defamation
and emotional distress claims depicted Falwell's first sexual encounter as an incestuous
relationship with his mother in an outhouse in Lynchburg, Virginia. See id. The ad parody
also portrayed Falwell as a drunkard. Id.
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readers should not consider seriously the advertisement's content. s9
On October 31, 1983, Falwell filed an action for defamation, invasion
of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia against Hustler,
Hustler's publisher Larry Flynt (Flynt), and Flynt Distributing Company
(FDC).90 The district court in Falwell dismissed Falwell's invasion of privacy
claim, ruling that Virginia law provides a right of action for invasion of
privacy only if a person uses another person's name or likeness for purposes
of trade or advertising. 9' The district court in Falwell determined that
Hustler did not use Falwell's name for purposes of trade or advertising.92
The district court in Falwell sent the questions of defamation and intentional
infliction of emotional distress to the jury. 93 The jury found for Hustler on
the defamation claim, determining that no reasonable man could believe
that Hustler had described actual facts about Falwell in its ad parody.
94
The jury found for Falwell, however, on the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim and awarded Falwell $200,000 in damages.
95
On the defendants' appeal of the emotional distress award, the Fourth
Circuit in Falwell considered whether a public figure plaintiff can recover
from the press for emotional distress that results from nonlibelous satirical
statements96 and whether, absent defamation, the first amendment "actual
89. See id. The disclaimer to the ad parody in Falwell appeared in small print at the
bottom of the page containing the ad parody. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc.,
796 F.2d 1148, 1150 (9th Cir. 1986). The disclaimer stated "Ad Parody-Not to Be Taken
Seriously." Id. Additionally, the table of contents of the November 1983 issue of Hustler listed
the parody as "Fiction; Ad and Personality Parody." Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1272.
90. See Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1272-73 (discussing district court adjudication of Falwell's
suit against Hustler).
91. See id. at 1273 (discussing district court's dismissal of Falwell's invasion of privacy
claim). In Falwell v. Flynt, the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia
recognized that Section 8.01-40 of the Virginia Code creates a cause of action for damages
that result from using a person's name or likeness for purposes of trade or advertising without
that person's consent. See id. (discussing district court decision); see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
40 (1984) (creating limited cause of action for invasion of privacy). The district court in
Falwell, however, determined that Falwell's invasion of privacy claim did not meet the
requirements of the Virginia Code definition because the Virginia statute would allow recovery
for privacy invasion only if Hustler had used Falwell's name for advertising purposes. See
Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1273 (discussing district court decision); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40
(1984) (creating limited cause of action for invasion of privacy); infra note 92 and accompanying
text (discussing reason that Falwell's invasion of privacy claim failed).
92. See Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1273 (discussing district court decision in Falwell).
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id. (discussing Falwell district court decision). In Falwell, the jury at the district
court level found against Hustler and Flynt on the emotional distress claim, but found Flynt
Distributing Co. innocent of the emotional distress claim. See id. The jury determined that
Falwell had suffered $100,000 in actual damages and, in addition, assessed $50,000 in punitive
damages against Flynt and $50,000 in punitive damages against Hustler. See id.
96. Id. at 1276-77. In Falwell, in addition to Hustler's appeal of the jury's award of
damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, Falwell filed a counterappeal of
14031987]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
malice" standard of New York Times should apply to emotional distress
actions against the press.97 In questioning whether a public figure plaintiff
can base intentional infliction of emotional distress claims on nonlibelous
satirical statements, the Fourth Circuit in Falwell considered the defendants'
claim that a plaintiff could not succeed on an emotional distress action
after failing to recover for defamation. 98 The Fourth Circuit in Falwell
determined that the elements of a defamation tort and an emotional distress
tort constitute separate principles.9 9 The Falwell court determined that, while
a plaintiff initiates a defamation action to remedy injury to the plaintiff's
reputation, a plaintiff initiates an emotional distress claim to seek compen-
sation for the plaintiff's psychic harm.' °° The Fourth Circuit in Falwell,
therefore, found that a plaintiff's failure to prevail in a defamation action
should not preclude the plaintiff from basing a claim of intentional infliction
of emotional distress on the same facts as the failed defamation claim.' 0'
After determining that an emotional distress claim can continue inde-
pendently from a defamation claim, the Fourth Circuit in Falwell considered
whether the first amendment requires that a plaintiff in an emotional distress
action against the press must meet the same actual malice standard of proof
as a plaintiff in a defamation action. 102 The Fourth Circuit in Falwell
determined that an action for defamation is not the only basis on which
individuals can recover for defamatory remarks published in a news me-
dium.0 3 The Fourth Circuit in Falwell recognized that a growing number
of courts allow a plaintiff to plead separately defamation, invasion of
privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress when all three causes
of action arise from a single tortious publication.' 4 The Fourth Circuit in
the district court's decision to dismiss Falwell's invasion of privacy claim. Id. at 1278. Falwell
claimed that Hustler should be liable for invasion of privacy. Id. at 1278. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, agreed with the district court's determination
that Hustler's parody did not violate the Virginia Code's invasion of privacy statute. Id.; see
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (1984) (allowing action for invasion of privacy when person uses
another person's name or likeness for trade or advertising purposes).
97. Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1273-76; see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80 (1964) (establishing actual malice standard for defamation actions).
98. Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1276. The defendants in Falwell suggested that a cause of action
based upon the emotional distress tort can succeed only if no other possible tort remedies
exist for a plaintiff. Id. The Falwell defendants argued that emotional distress tort remedies
do not exist if the allegedly tortious conduct resembles a traditionally recognized tort, such
as libel. Id.; see supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing traditional parasitic application
of intentional infliction of emotional distress claims).
99. Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1276.
100. Id.
101. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Falwell also considered several evidentiary issues relating
to the admission of videotaped testimony and of prior derogatory statements that Hustler had
published. Id. at 1276-77. The Falwell court upheld the admission of both types of evidence.
Id.





Falwell, however, determined that to maintain the validity of first amend-
ment protection and to avert self-censorship, a defendant publisher must
receive the same degree of first amendment protection in an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress that a publisher receives in a first
amendment defamation action.I05
In considering the degree of first amendment protection that should
apply in emotional distress actions against the press, the Fourth Circuit in
Falwell determined that the first amendment actual malice standard of New
York Times must apply in intentional infliction of emotional distress tort
actions brought by public figures.1 6 In applying the actual malice standard
to intentional infliction of emotional distress tort actions, however, the
Fourth Circuit in Falwell stated that the New York Times actual malice
standard focuses on the culpability or intent of a defendant publisher.
1 7
The Fourth Circuit in Falwell further determined that the actual malice
standard does not emphasize a publisher's knowing or reckless publication
of a false work, but emphasizes only the publisher's intent in publishing a
work.' ," The Fourth Circuit in Falwell found that the truth or falsity of a
published work is unimportant in an emotional distress action because the
truth or falsity of a publication is not an element of the emotional distress
tort.19 The Fourth Circuit in Falwell determined that the first amendment
does not protect the press if a plaintiff shows that a defendant publisher's
intentional or reckless misconduct has caused severe emotional distress. 1" 0
Although the Falwell court recognized that the first amendment protects
the press when a nonlibelous statement causes a public figure to suffer
emotional distress, the Falwell court's actual malice definition appears to





109. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Falwell cited Womack v. Eldridge in discussing the elements
that a plaintiff traditionally must prove in an intentional infliction of emotional distress action
in Virginia. Id. at 1275 n.4; see Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148
(1974). The Falwell court noted that, according to the Virginia Supreme Court in Womack, a
plaintiff in an intentional infliction of emotional distress action must prove intentional or
reckless conduct by a defendant publisher, conduct by a defendant publisher that offends
accepted standards of decency, conduct by a defendant publisher that caused the plaintiff's
emotional distress, and severe emotional distress. Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1275 n.4; see Womack,
215 Va. at 342, 210 S.E.2d at 148; supra note 16 (defining intentional infliction of emotional
distress tort). The Falwell court found that the truth or falsity of an injurious statement is
irrelevant in an intentional infliction of emotional distress tort action. Falwell, 797 F.2d at
1275-76.
110. Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1275. The Falwell court determined that the possibility that
Hustler's parody constituted opinion was inconsequential in an action for emotional distress.
Id. at 1276. The Fourth Circuit found that, because falsity was not an element of the emotional
distress tort, the only issue before the court was whether Hustler's parody was sufficiently
outrageous to meet the outrageousness proof requirement of the intentional infliction of
emotional distress tort. Id.
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reckless disregard of the truth.- The Fourth Circuit in Falwell, in focusing
on intent to harm, appears to circumvent the protection that the actual
malice fault standard of New York Times provides the press." 2 The Falwell
court established that, in emotional distress actions against the press, a
plaintiff who shows that a defendant publisher intended to cause emotional
distress satisfies the actual malice standard, despite the Supreme Court's
holding in New York Times that recognized the insufficiency of intent to
harm or "ill will" to establish actual malice or the press' liability." 3 The
New York Times standard places liability on the press for knowingly or
recklessly publishing a falsehood." 4 By reverting to common-law "ill will"
fault standards, courts substantially reduce the burdens on public figure
plaintiffs who seek to recover damages from media defendants.",5 Many
commentators argue that ill will is too easy for a plaintiff to establish
because a reporter often develops some ill feelings against the subject of a
story in the course of news investigations, particularly when the subject of
a story has committed serious crimes or created bad feelings in the com-
munity." 6 The Supreme Court has provided plaintiffs with substantial
Ill. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84 (1966) (to prove actual malice, plaintiff
must show defendant's intent to inflict harm through falsehood, not simply intent to inflict
harm); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965) (same); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64, 73 (1964) (intent to harm is insufficient to prove actual malice); Reliance Insurance Co.
v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1351 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (same); Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting
Co., 555 P.2d 556, 563 (Wyo. 1976) (same); R. SAcI, supra note 16, at 218 (same). Compare
Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1274 (allowing recovery for public figure on proof that defendant
intentionally published material with ill will) with New York Times, 397 U.S. at 279-80 (denying
recovery unless public official proves that defendant knowingly or recklessly published false
material).
112. See supra note Il and accompanying text (listing courts finding that intent to harm
is insufficient to prove actual malice).
113. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (allowing liability for defamation only if
plaintiff proves actual malice); see also Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965) (intent to
inflict harm does not establish actual malice); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964)
(same); Sheer & Zardkoohi, An Analysis of the Economic Efficiency of the Law of Defamation,
80 Nw. U.L. REv. 364, 371 n.18 (1985) (neither hostility nor ill will proves actual malice); Note,
The Future of Libel Law and Independent Appellate Review: Making Sense of Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 71 Co.NMe L. REv. 477, 495 n.113 (1986) (authored
by Gary A. Paranzino) (motive of vindictiveness does not prove actual malice); supra note 16
(defining actual malice).
114. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
115. See R. SACK, supra note 9, at 211-12 & 214 n.168 (defendant's ill will towards
plaintiff is, at most, possible indication of actual malice, but is not sufficient to prove actual
malice); B. SANFoRD, supra note 12, § 8.4.3.2, at 314 (hostility or ill will is not sufficient to
establish actual malice); Bloom, Proof of Fault in Media Defamation Litigation, 38 V~aD. L.
REv. 247, 260-61 (1985) (different proof requirements apply to common-law ill will standard
and constitutional actual malice standard); LeBel, The Infliction of Harm Through the
Publication of Fiction: Fashioning a Theory of Liability, 51 BROOKLYN L. REv. 281, 334-35
(1985) (when press publishes fiction, common-law intent to harm is often easy to establish).
116. See Bloom, supra note 115, at 261-64 (reporter sometimes develops hostility toward
subject of story during his investigation); Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates,
49 CoLuM. L. REv. 875, 893 n.90 (1949) (ill will against plaintiff sometimes may be impossible
to refute); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (same).
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discovery rights in defamation cases against the press, which further serve
to decrease a plaintiff's burden in proving a reporter's ill feelings towards
the plaintiff."
7
Because of the ease with which plaintiffs can prove ill will against media
defendants, numerous courts disagree with the fault standard that the Falwell
court developed." 8 These courts have held that a plaintiff cannot recover
separately for the intentional infliction of emotional distress if the
plaintiff's defamation claim, based on the same facts as the emotional
distress claim, fails." 9 For example, in Hutchison v. Proxmire,120 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, after rejecting a plaintiff's
defamation claim, considered whether the plaintiff could retain a cause of
action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress when the plaintiff
based the emotional distress claim on the same facts as the failed defamation
claim.' 2' In Hutchison, the defendant, Senator Proxmire, during a speech
on the Senate floor, described plaintiff Hutchison's scientific research on
the causes of animal and human aggression as a study into why "rats,
monkeys, and humans bite and clench their jaws" and acknowledged
Hutchison's research as an example of wasteful government spending.
22
Although Hutchison claimed defamation in his suit against Proxmire, the
Tenth Circuit dismissed the plaintiff's defamation suit because the plaintiff
did not satisfy the burden of proving that the defendant had made his
117. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (first amendment does not protect
journalist's internal thought processes and internal editorial discussions from discovery). In
Herbert v. Lando, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a plaintiff who wanted
to prove actual malice could use discovery procedures to procure information regarding the
press' thought processes in developing a story. Id. at 169-77; see supra note 11 (defining actual
malice). In Lando, the plaintiff, the subject of a documentary broadcasted on the CBS
television program "60 Minutes," sued the producer of the "60 Minutes" program, alleging
that the show's commentator had made defamatory comments about the plaintiff's Vietnam
military service record. Id. at 156. The Supreme Court in Lando recognized that the plaintiff
could not prove that the defendant had acted with actual malice, a critical element of the
defamation claim, by looking into the opinions and thoughts of the defendant because ill will
does not suffice to establish actual malice. Id. at 175-76; see supra note 11 (defining actual
malice). The Court determined that, because of the difficulty in proving actual malice, the
plaintiff should be able to delve into the thought processes and internal editorial decisions that
the press made in developing the story. Id. at 174-75.
118. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Proxmire, 579 F.2d 1027, 1036 (7th Cir. 1978) (finding that
emotional distress is merely result of defamatory statements), rev'd on other grounds, 443
U.S. 111 (1979); Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 13 MED. L. REP. (BNA) 1657, 1662 (D. Or.
1986) (no separate action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when same facts
give rise to libel action); Fisher v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 557-58, 373 N.E.2d 1215, 1217,
402 N.Y.S.2d 991, 993 (1978) (questioning whether plaintiff should be able to base emotional
distress action on facts that fall within traditional tort claim).
119. See supra note 118 (listing court decisions holding that no action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress exists when emotional distress claim rests on same facts as
failed libel claim).
120. 579 F.2d 1027 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
121. Id. at 1036.
122. Id. at 1030.
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statements with "actual malice.' ' 2 After finding that the plaintiff's defa-
mation claim failed, the Hutchison court considered the plaintiff's claim
that he should recover for the emotional distress that the defendant inten-
tionally had inflicted on the plaintiff.124 The Tenth Circuit in Hutchison
implied that the purpose of the New York Times actual malice standard in
defamation cases is to provide a safeguard for each individual's constitu-
tional right to free speech. 125 The Hutchison court determined that, if the
plaintiff could recover for emotional distress when the statements did not
constitute defamatory statements, the plaintiffs recovery would defeat the
purposes of the actual malice requirement in defamation actions and of the
first amendment free speech guaranty. 26 The Tenth Circuit in Hutchison
reasoned that the allegation of intentional infliction of emotional distress
resulted from the defendant's nondefamatory statements. 27 The Hutchison
court concluded that allowing the plaintiff to recover for emotional distress
after the plaintiff had failed to establish defamation would defeat the
purpose of the New York Times actual malice standard.'2 The Hutchinson
court, therefore, found that the plaintiff could not recover for intentional
infliction of emotional distress because the defendant's statements regarding
the plaintiff did not meet the actual malice standard and were not defam-
atory under the first amendment.
129
In addition to the Tenth Circuit's determination in Hutchison that a
plaintiff bringing an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim must
prove that the press acted with actual malice, the Tenth Circuit has deter-
mined that a public figure's action for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress must fail if the press' statement is not a believable false statement
of fact. 30 In Pring v. Penthouse International, Inc.,31 the Tenth Circuit
123. Id. at 1036; see supra note 11 (defining actual malice). Following the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, the
United States Supreme Court later reversed the Hutchison court's decision that the plaintiff
did not prove actual malice. See Hutchison v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 136 (1979) (reversing
Tenth Circuit decision on defamation issue).
124. Hutchison, 579 F.2d at 1036.
125. See id. at 1036 n. 16 (constitutional right to free speech requires protection of actual
malice standard); see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. I (establishing right to freedom of speech).
126. Hutchison, 579 F.2d at 1036 & n.16.
127. Id. at 1036.
128. Id. at 1036 & n.16.
129. Id. at 1036.
130. See Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 695 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir. 1982) (applying first
amendment protections to intentional infliction of emotional distress action), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1132 (1983); see also Palm Beach Newspapers v. Early, 334 So. 2d 50, 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976) (cartoons attacking public official are not defamatory when cartoons fail to express
believable false facts); Springer v. Viking Press, 90 A.D.2d 315, 317-18, 457 N.Y.S.2d 246,
248 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (requiring private figure plaintiff to prove defamatory falsehood
before recovery in intentional infliction of emotional distress action); Note, supra note 16, at
1778-83 (discussing argument that public figures should not recover for intentional infliction
of emotional distress tort).
131. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
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considered whether a fictional story had defamed a public figure. 13 2 In
Pring, the public figure plaintiff, the former winner of a state beauty
contest, claimed that a fictional story which comically detailed a beauty
queen's sexual talent had injured her reputation. 3 3 The Tenth Circuit in
Pring determined that, because a reasonable man could not believe that the
fictional story portrayed true events, no defamation occurred.1 34 Recognizing
that unbelievable stories could not constitute the false representation of fact
that courts require in defamation actions, the Pring court determined that
the first amendment precludes imposing liability on the press for unbelievable
statements." 5 After finding that the published story had not defamed the
plaintiff, the Tenth Circuit briefly examined the applicability of the first
amendment defamation principles to an "outrageous conduct," or inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, claim. 3 The Pring court recognized
that detaching the emotional distress claim from the defamation claim served
no useful purpose because the same first amendment considerations applied
to both claims. 3 7 The Tenth Circuit's decision in Pring, therefore, implies
that the falsity and believability elements of a first amendment defamation
cause of action must attach to a public figure's intentional infliction of
emotional distress action against the press.
31
Although the Tenth Circuit implies that, to recover for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, public figure plaintiffs must prove that the
press' statement is believable, one commentator has argued that, if the
statement discussing the public figure is in pure satirical form, the press
should have an absolute privilege against defamation and emotional distress
claims. 3 9 The commentator has argued that satire is an expression of opinion
132. Id. at 439.
133. Id. at 440-41. In Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd., Penthouse, the magazine
that the defendant published, printed a fictional story that described an event at a Miss
America contest. Id. at 440. The story described Charlene, the Miss Wyoming participant in
the Miss America contest, who performed astounding sexual acts onstage with a baton during
the contest. Id. at 441. The plaintiff, the Miss Wyoming entrant in the actual Miss America
contest, also was a baton twirler who had won a national baton twirling championship. See
R. SMOLLA, SUING noE PRsUss 163 (discussing facts of Pring). The plaintiff claimed that the
story that Penthouse had printed defamed her by creating the impression that the plaintiff
actually had performed these sexual acts during the contest. Id.
134. Pring, 695 F.2d at 442-43. In Pring, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit overturned a jury verdict for the plaintiff of $1.5 million in actual damages and
$25 million in punitive damages. See R. SMOLLA, supra note 133, at 163-64 (discussing lower
court's decision in Pring).
135. Pring, 695 F.2d at 443.
136. Id. at 442; see supra note 16 (discussing intentional infliction of emotional distress
tort).
137. Pring, 695 F.2d at 442.
138. See id. (requiring that same first amendment standards apply to defamation actions
and to intentional infliction of emotional distress actions).
139. Dorsen, supra note 1, at 939; see Comment, Defamation in Fiction: The Case for
Absolute First Amendment Protection, 29 Am. U.L. Rav. 571, 582, 593 (1980) (fiction is
opinion that should receive absolute first amendment protection); supra note 7 (discussing
absolutist interpretation to first amendment).
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and, as opinion, should receive absolute protection. 4' Although courts do
not appear to extend absolute privileges to satire, many courts have implied
that satire should receive absolute protection if the satire constitutes
opinion and not fact.' 41 For example, in Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc.,142 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered the
distinctions between fact and opinion. 43 In Janklow, the public figure
plaintiff claimed that the defendant, the publisher of the Newsweek maga-
zine, had defamed him by publishing an article which impliedly stated that
the plaintiff had raped a teenage Indian girl. 144 The Janklow court recognized
that the first amendment provides absolute protection for opinion because
no opinion can be false. 145 In distinguishing between fact and opinion, the
Eighth Circuit in Janklow weighed four factors to determine whether the
implicit allegation should receive absolute protection as an opinion.'1 The
Janklow court concluded that, by looking at the precision and specificity, 47
verifiability, 41 literary context, 49 and "public context"' 150 of an allegedly
injurious statement, courts adequately could determine whether a statement
constituted fact or opinion.'
5'
In applying the Janklow court's four factors that distinguish fact from
opinion to satirical comments, commentators argue that the general context
and unverifiability of satire normally will require findings that satire con-
stitutes opinion. 52 The purpose of satire is to provide social or political
criticism in an exaggerated manner. 53 Often, a satirist, through a satire,
intends to create change through criticism. 5 4 By making readers uncom-
140. Dorsen, supra note 1, at 939; see Comment, supra note 139, at 582, 593 (fiction
should receive absolute first amendment protection).
141. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (stating that opinion
should receive absolute first amendment protection); infra notes 142-52 and accompanying text
(discussing cases that provide absolute constitutional protection to opinion).
142. 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 272 (1986).
143. Id. at 1302-03.
144. Id. at 1301.
145. Id. at 1302; see supra note 12 (discussing courts' recognition that opinion cannot
constitute defamatory statement).
146. Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
272 (1986); see Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 974-75 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (recognizing
four factors to use in determining if statement is fact or opinion), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985).




151. Id. at 1302-03.
152. See Dorsen, supra note 1, at 929-30 (courts should view satire as nonactionable
opinion); Comment, supra note 139, at 582, 593 (fiction is opinion that should receive absolute
first amendment protection); see also R. SmoLLA, supra note 133, at 181 (questioning whether
public figures should recover for emotional distress); Note, supra note 16, at 1777-78 (humor
should not provide basis for recovery under intentional infliction of emotional distress tort).




fortable, a satirist often hopes to cause readers to reevaluate accepted
standards. 55 The Falwell court's decision to allow public figures to recover
emotional distress damages for nonlibelous satirical opinion, however, cir-
cumvents the first amendment's absolute protection of opinion.'56 In New
York Times, the Supreme Court stated that the purpose of the first amend-
ment freedom of the press is to encourage free political discussion and the
exchange of ideas. 5 7 The Supreme Court, by developing first amendment
defamation proof standards, has attempted to set guidelines that allow the
press to express opinion without fear of liability.15' Despite the Supreme
Court's first amendment proof standards, however, the press increasingly
has had to defend its actions and publications in court. 59 Most defamation
actions that reach a jury result in substantial damage awards for the
plaintiff.' 60 Juries apparently tend to base damage awards partly on the
popularity of the media defendant, and not solely on the plaintiff's suffered
harm.'6 ' Although the Supreme Court has determined that courts should
not attempt to base awards on the popularity of an expressed view, contro-
versial publications such as Hustler have had to defend against numerous
lawsuits, and juries often have awarded substantial damages to plaintiffs. 62
Although the majority of high damage awards are reversed or reduced on
appeal,' 63 litigation costs for the press steadily increase. 64 Publishers, hoping
155. Id. at 924.
156. See Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1277 (allowing public figure plaintiff to recover emotional
distress damages for nonlibelous satire); supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing
argument that opinion receives absolute first amendment protection).
157. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270-72.
158. See supra notes 28-44 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional standards
that Supreme Court has devised to encourage free expression of ideas).
159. See R. SMOLLA, supra note 133, at 4-7 (discussing explosion of libel litigation against
press); Nagel, How to Stop Libel Suits and Still Protect Individual Reputation, 17 WASH.
MONTHLY 12, 13 (Nov. 1985) (noting increasing number of libel suits against which press must
defend).
160. See R. SMOLLA, supra note 133, at 6 (listing cases in which juries awarded defamed
plaintiff substantial damages); Nagel, supra note 159, at 13 (discussing enormous jury awards
in libel suits). As of November 1985, juries in over 20 libel suits had awarded the plaintiff
over $I million in damages. See Nagel, supra note 159, at 13 (discussing study of jury awards
in libel actions).
161. See R. SMOLLA, supra note 133, at 176 (juries often find unpopular media defendants
liable because jury dislikes defendant rather than because defendant published injurious
statement).
162. See id. at 162 (in last few years, plaintiffs have initiated numerous defamation and
privacy suits against publications such as Penthouse and Hustler).
163. See R. SMOLLA, supra note 133, at 77 (appeal courts reverse two-thirds of jury
verdicts against press); Note, Defamation and the Public Official: The Big Chill, 6 COMPUTER/
LAW J. 725, 733 (1986) (appeal courts overturn or reduce 75% of jury verdicts in libel actions);
Appeals Court Rules Post Did Not Libel Tavoulareas, Washington Post, March 14, 1987, §
A, at I, col. 4 (discussing appeals court's dismissal of jury's $2.05 million verdict against press
in libel action).
164. See Massing, Libel Insurance: Scrambling for Coverage, 24 COLUM. JOURNALISM REv.
35, 35 (Jan./Feb. 1986) (discussing increasing costs of libel insurance); Note, supra note 163,
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to reduce litigation costs, have argued for stricter standards of liability in
legal actions against the press.
165
Although publishers hope for stricter and more exact liability standards
in actions involving the press, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Falwell merely
increases the possibility that a public figure will litigate and recover against
the press for satirical comment. 66 The Fourth Circuit's decision in Falwell
chills the press' initiative to print any controversial satire because, under
Falwell, the media cannot rely on the protection of the New York Times
first amendment standards in legal actions brought by public figures, even
if the published satire is completely unbelievable. 67 Neither reporters nor
editors can make informed publication decisions regarding controversial
topics because the media cannot know with certainty the issues and articles
that will create reader discomfort. 68 The press' liability will depend on the
sensibilities of a jury in determining what a reasonable man would find
outrageous. 69 This standard of outrageousness affords no guidelines to the
at 725 (discussing rising litigation costs for press because of increasing number of suits).
Although the increasing costs of libel litigation pose a problem for all major news media, the
greatest dangers from skyrocketing libel insurance rates exist for small news organizations,
whose profits often are too little to pay large libel insurance premiums. Note, supra note 163,
at 743.
165. See Nagel, supra note 159, at 13 (discussing publishers' arguments that courts should
provide press with greater protection against libel and privacy actions). According to the
American Civil Liberties Union, many publishers would like courts to adopt proof requirements
that would virtually guarantee absolute protection against libel and privacy actions. See id.
(discussing report of American Civil Liberties Union). These publishers would like courts to
adopt standards that do not investigate a reporter's "state of mind" and that do not impose
liability for knowingly or recklessly publishing a defamatory falsehood about a public figure.
Id.
166. See Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1275 (allowing public figures to recover damages for
intentional infliction of emotional distress upon showing defendant's intent to harm plaintiff);
R. SMOLLA, supra note 133, at 169 (noting that Falwell decision allows subjects of parodies to
circumvent press protections developed in libel laws).
167. See Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1277 (allowing public figure plaintiff to recover emotional
distress damages for unbelievable satire); supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing
Falwell court's circumvention of libel laws); see also Dorsen, supra note 1, at 939 (arguing
that unbelievable satire should receive absolute protection as opinion).
168. See Dorsen, supra note 1, at 927 (satirists who want to predict satirical statements
that will create liability act without clear guidelines); Note, supra note 16, at 1778 (discussing
inability of political satires to be both insightful and inoffensive); see also R. SMOLLA, supra
note 133, at 175-76 (juries often find unpopular and unsympathetic media defendants liable
because of identity of defendants rather than actions of defendants).
169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 46 comment d (1965) (discussing outrageous-
ness element of intentional infliction of emotional distress tort); R. SMOLLA, supra note 133,
at 181 (juries punish "bad taste" and unpopular ideas in intentional infliction of emotional
distress actions); supra notes 16 & 19 (discussing outrageousness element of intentional infliction
of emotional distress tort); see also Nagel, supra note 159, at 13 (in libel suits, 90% of jury
verdicts favor plaintiffs). Increased liability for the press will only dissuade the press from
publishing any controversial ideas. Note, supra note 163, at 743. Although allowing juries to
punish arguably unpopular defendants such as Hustler and Penthouse for intentional infliction
of emotional distress does not appear initially to affect more respected newspapers and publishers,
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press in making publication decisions. 70 Public figures should not be able
to assert their views publicly, and then, without proving that a satirist
violated the New York Times first amendment standards, sue a satirist who
comments unfavorably on the public figure.17' By creating the possibility of
liability for nondefamatory statements, the Falwell decision creates an
impediment to the press' incentive to provide a forum for a completely free
exchange of ideas.
72
The Falwell decision allowing public figures to recover from the press
for the publication of nonlibelous satirical commentary reduces the press'
incentive to report new opinions to the public. 7 Because the Falwell decision
chills the press' incentive to report controversial matters, the Fourth Circuit
circumvents the constitutional defamation standards that the Supreme Court
has established to encourage open discussion. 74 Unless the Supreme Court
alters its defamation standards, 75 courts should not allow public figure
plaintiffs to bypass the first amendment and recover on emotional distress
claims without proving actual malice or falsity. 76 By requiring a public
figure plaintiff to show both malice and falsity before allowing the plaintiff
to recover for emotional distress, courts would encourage the media to express
one commentator has argued that the "spillover" effect of precedential judgments against
unpopular media defendants for nondefamatory publications quickly will lead to attacks on
respected publications. R. SMOU.A, supra note 133, at 181.
170. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text (discussing press' difficulties resulting
from court decisions that allow public figures to recover for intentional infliction of emotional
distress); see also Note, supra note 163, at 743 (increasing litigation costs dissuade press from
publishing any controversial ideas).
171. See B. SANFoRD, supra note 12, § 11.3.4, at 455 (intentional infliction of emotional
distress should not apply to media because of courts' failure to attach first amendment
considerations to tort).
172. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text (discussing problems that result from
allowing public figures to recover for emotional distress caused by nondefamatory satire).
173. See supra notes 96-110 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's decision
in Falwell); supra notes 112-117 and accompanying text (discussing ways in which Falwell
decision circumvents Supreme Court defamation standards); supra notes 166-70 & 172 and
accompanying text (discussing ways in which Falwell decision reduces press' incentive to publish
satire).
174. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text (discussing Falwell court's circumven-
tion of first amendment); supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text (discussing chilling effect
that Falwell court may have on press' incentive to publish new ideas and opinions).
175. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2950-53
(1985) (White, J., concurring) (suggesting that Supreme Court should abandon actual malice
standard in defamation law). In his concurrence in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., Justice White proposed that the Court, in developing standards for defamation
law, should abandon the actual malice standard. Id. at 2950. Justice White suggests returning
to a common-law malice standard but limiting the amount of recoverable damages. Id. at
2950, 2952.
176. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text (discussing view that public figures
should not recover damages in violation of New York Times first amendment standards); see
also supra note 13 (defining public figure); supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text (discussing
New York Times first amendment standards).
1987] 1413
1414 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
opinions about public and political figures without fear of liability.177 The
Fourth Circuit's decision in Falwell, however, fails to provide the press with
adequate first amendment protection. 78 By allowing public figures to circum-
vent defamation law with the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort,
the Falwell court not only restricts the press' first amendment rights, but
inhibits public discussion controversial ideas.17 9
HAROLD D. LESTER, JR.
ADDENDUM
On February 24, 1988, the United States Supreme Court, in Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 56 U.S.L.W. 4180 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1988)(No. 86-
1278), reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision to award Mr. Falwell damages
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Supreme Court
determined that a public figure cannot recover damages for the emotional
distress that results from the publication of satire without showing that the
satire contains a believable but false statement of fact and that the writer
published that satire with actual malice.
177. See supra notes 11 & 36-44 and accompanying text (discussing New York Times first
amendment standards of actual malice and falsity); supra note 12 (discussing differences
between fact and opinion); supra notes 28-35 & 157-58 and accompanying text (discussing
Supreme Court's emphasis on free expression of ideas).
178. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text (discussing ease with which plaintiffs
can meet Falwell fault standard); supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text (discussing
disincentive that Falwell court provides press to publicize unpopular or controversial ideas).
179. See supra notes 166-72 and accompanying text (discussing issues that courts create
by allowing public figures to recover emotional distress damages for nondefamatory satire).
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